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RETURNS, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE
CHANGES UNDER THE 1954 INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE*
GEORGE H. ALLAN
0 the Denver Bar; District Director of Internal Revenue, District of Colorado
The topic assigned to me is "Returns, Practice, and Procedure
Changes under the 1954 Revenue Act." This embraces a multitude
of changes, some of which will concern you rather frequently,
others infrequently. I will discuss the ones which appear to be of
the greatest general interest.
As you know, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 became law
upon its approval by the President at 9:45 a.m., Eastern Daylight
Time, on August 16, 1954. Its various provisions become effective
at various times thereafter. Some, such as those relating to estate
tax, became effective immediately. Many of them were effective on
the day after enactment. Others became effective on January 1,
1955. Some of them apply to taxes imposed under the 1939 code.
Others apply only to taxes imposed by the 1954 code, and still others
apply to taxes under either code. I will point out the effective dates
of the various sections as I discuss them.
As you realize, most of these new sections of law must be
officially interpreted by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with
the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury before they may be-
come operative. These official interpretations, which will be in the
form of regulations, have been in course of preparation for some
time and are now being readied for issuance as rapidly as possible.
Until these regulations are issued and the official interpretation of
the law has been announced, anything that I may say about them,
or that anyone else can say about them, is a matter of personal
opinion and not an authoritative technical explanation.
For our purpose here this morning, I plan to call your atten-
tion to many of the changes which have been made and to para-
phrase to you as best I can the highlights of the text of the law
itself. As the various regulations are issued, you will then be able
to ascertain the technical interpretation placed upon these sections.
I have followed as closely as possible the content and topical ar-
rangement furnished to me by your Tax Institute Committee, and
I will follow the order in which their outline groups the items.
FILING AND PAYING REQUIREMENTS
Under the new code Section 6072(a) extends the period al-
lowed for filing individual income tax returns by an additional
month, so that individuals and partnerships may file on or before
the fifteenth day of April, or of the fourth month following the
close of their taxable year if on a fiscal year basis. This is applicable
*The articles included in this issue are from addresses given by the authors
at the University of Denver Tax Institute, 1954.
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to taxable years beginning after 1953, except short taxable years
ending in 1954 on or before the date of enactment.
A change has been made under Section 6012 as to individual
filing liability. The former minimum of a gross income of $600 or
more has been changed with respect to a taxpayer sixty-five years
of age or older, who is not required to file a return unless he has
gross income of $1200 or more for the taxable year. This provision
is applicable only to taxable years beginning after 1953 and end-
ing after the date of enactment.
Under the prior law, if separate returns were filed by husband
and wife and they later desired to file a joint return, it was neces-
sary for them to pay all of the tax shown on the separate returns
before the joint return could be filed. Now, under Section 6013,
the requirement has been modified so that a joint return may be
filed if the total tax shown on the joint return is paid in full at or
before the time it is filed. This provision is limited to taxable years
beginning after 1953 and ending after the date of enactment.
Section 6065 relating to verification of returns authorizes the
Secretary to provide by regulations for certain returns, statements
or other documents to be filed without a declaration under oath or
under penalties of perjury. It further provides that an oath may
not be required in case of individual income tax returns or declara-
tions. This section applies only to taxes imposed by the 1954 code.
The place for filing returns or other documents under Section
6091 is substantially the same as it was under old Section 53 (b) as
to income tax returns, except that now the Secretary, by regula-
tions, may select the place for filing returns by persons who have
no legal residence or principal place of business in any internal
revenue district. Formerly, Baltimore, Maryland, was designated
as to the place for such filing. This Section 6091 (b) (1) applies
only to taxes imposed by the 1954 code.
CORPORATE RETURNS:
Section 6072 continues the provisions of prior law which re-
quired returns of corporations on a calendar year basis to be filed
on or before March 15, and those on a fiscal year basis on or before
the fifteenth day of the third month following the close of the
fiscal year.
A change is made by Section 6072 (d) with respect to the
returns of exempt cooperatives which now are to be filed on or
before the fifteenth day of the ninth month following the close of
the taxable year instead of the third month as heretofore. These
provisions are applicable to taxable years beginning after 1953,
except short taxable years ending in 1954 on or before the date
of enactment.
Section 6091(b) (2) requires corporate returns to be filed in
the district in which is located the principal place of business or
principal office or agency of the corporation, or, if it has none in
any internal revenue district, then at such place as the Secretary
or his delegate by regulations may prescribe. These provisions,
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which eliminate the prior specific requirement for filing in Balti-
more, are applicable only to taxes imposed by the 1954 code.
As to the signing of corporation returns, Section 6062 now
provides that only one corporate officer need sign instead of the
two required under prior law. This provision is effective as to
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1953, except short
taxable years ending on or before the date of enactment.
With respect to consolidated returns, Section 1504 changes the
intercorporate stock ownership test by decreasing it from the 95
per cent requirement of the prior law to a new 80 per cent require-
ment. Section 1503 eliminates the 2 per cent additional tax on in-
come of those members of the affiliated group which are regulated
public utilities, including certain lessors of railroad properties. This
applies only to taxable years beginning after 1953, except short
years ending on or before date of enactment.
The next topic was designated by your committee as "Sense-
less Returns," which they spell "Cents-less." Perhaps there are a
few returns filed which present such a distorted picture that they
might be well called "senseless" in the normal understanding of
that term, but here we are referring to two new provisions of the
code, Sections 6102 and 7504.
Section 6102 authorizes the Secretary or his delegate to pro-
vide by regulations for the filing of returns in whole dollar amounts
instead of requiring the showing of cents. He is authorized to do
this either by eliminating the figures showing cents or by round-
ing to the nearest dollar. This provision is only to apply to the
total amount required to be shown on any line on a return, and
does not extend to the computation of the various items which are
aggregated for the purpose of determining such amount. The
section further provides if any taxpayer does not wish to use whole
dollar amount, he may file on the same basis as under the present
law, that is, by filing exact cents. The effective date of this pro-
vision is the day after enactment. However, it applies only to
taxes imposed under the 1954 code and will become operative only
through the issuance of regulations.
The companion section, 7504, will permit the rounding to the
nearest dollar of any assessment of deficiency or underpayment,
or of a credit or refund. This section became effective the day after
enactment with respect to taxes imposed by either the 1939 or 1954
code, but, again, it will become operative only through the issu-
ance of regulations.
EXTENSIONS OF TIME
Section 6081 limits extensions of time for filing of any return,
declaration, statement of other document, to a maximum of six
months except that in the case of taxpayers who are abroad, a
longer extension may be granted. This six-month limitation does
not change the prior law as to income taxes and certain other taxes,
but it does extend to six months the maximum which may be granted
as to a number of taxes where maximum extensions of only thirty,
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sixty or ninety days were permissible under the 1939 code. In-
cluded in that group of taxes are:








Telephone, Telegraph, Radio and Cable Facilities
The effective date of this section was the day after enactment for
taxes imposed by the 1954 code.
As to the filing of corporation returuns, Section 6081 provides
that an automatic extension of three months will be granted if
there is filed a prescribed form (and Form No. 7004 has been pre-
scribed for this purpose), and if such corporation pays on or before
the due date the amount properly estimated as its tax for the first
installment thereof. This automatic extension may be terminated
at any time by mailing to the taxpayer a notice of such termina-
tion at least ten days prior to the date of such termination fixed
in such notice. The provisions of Section 6081 became effective the
day after enactment, but pertain only to taxes imposed by the 1954
code. This will be implemented by regulations.
With respect to extensions of time for paying tax, Section 6161
provides that a reasonable period, not to exceed six months, may
be granted except that the period may exceed six months in the
case of taxpayers abroad. This section now establishes the six
months maximum extension uniformly as to various excise and
other taxes on the same basis as the previously authorized six
months extension in the case of income, FUTA, estimated and
gift taxes. It became effective the day after enactment, but its
application is limited to taxes imposed by the 1954 code.
The following section, 6162, authorizes the Secretary or his
delegate to prescribe regulations extending the time for payment
of tax on gains attributable to liquidation of personal holding com-
panies for a period not to exceed five years from the date fixed
for payment of such tax. Extensions under this section may be
granted only where it is shown that failure to grant the extension
will result in undue hardship. It became effective the day after
enactment, but is applicable only to taxable years beginning before
January 1, 1956.
qi, ,fnn 6165 extens to al-] taxes the provisions "-i'hunde
prior laws applied only to income, estate and gift tax, that the
Secretary or his delegate may require a taxpayer to furnish bond,
not to exceed double the amount of the liability, whenever an ex-
tension of time for paying a tax is granted. Such bond is to be
conditioned upon payment of the tax or deficiency in accordance
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with the terms of such extension. This extension of the bond pro-
visions to all taxes is consistent with the extension to other taxes
of the provisions permitting an extension of time for payment.
This section became effective on the day after enactment, but it
applies only to taxes imposed under the 1954 Code.
With respect to so-called information returns, Section 6041
provides that now information returns are only required from in-
dividuals for payments which they make in the course of a trade
or business, consisting of rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annui-
ties, compensations, remunerations, emoluments or other fixed or
determinable gains, profits and income of $600 or more in any
taxable year. The provisions of this section are effective for tax-
able years after 1953, and regulations will be issued. The pro-
visions of the prior law requiring information returns by persons
in the business of collecting foreign items, and with respect to in-
formation returns by corporations making payments of interest
regardless of amounts, continue in effect.
DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX
The requirement for the Declaration of Estimated Income Tax by
an individual has been changed somewhat by Section 6015. For
1955 and subsequent years an individual must file an estimate only
if his gross income consisting of wages, and not more than $100
from sources other than wages, can be reasonably expected to ex-
ceed $5,000 in the case of a single individual, and $10,000 in the
case of a head of a household or a married couple. As to an indi-
vidual whose gross income is expected to include more than $100
from non-withheld sources, he must file an estimate if his antici-
pated gross income is greater than the amount obtained by multi-
plying $600 by the number of his exemptions, and adding $400
thereto. Declarations of estimated tax by individuals now are to
be filed on or before April 15, or the fifteenth day of the fourth
month after the close of the taxable year, in accordance with the
provisions of Section 6073.
Under the 1954 Code, Section 6015, January 31 is the last date
on which an individual may file a return for the taxable year and
have it considered as the declaration or amendment due January 15.
In the case of farmers, the last day for filing such returns is Feb-
ruary 15.
As to the date on which payments are to be made by an in-
dividual of his estimated income tax, Section 6153 changes the
date for paying the first installment of estimated income tax from
the fifteenth day of the third month, to the fifteenth day of the
fourth month of the taxable year. The due dates of subsequent in-
stallments have not been changed.
The penalties for failure to comply with the estimated income
tax requirements (our troublesome old Section 294(d)) have been
modified and ameliorated by Section 6654. It substitutes the single
addition of 6 percent per annum for the various penalties pro-
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vided under prior law. The new 6 percent addition is computed
from the due date of each installment on the difference between the
amount paid and 70 percent of what should have been paid. In the
case of farmers this amount is 66 2/3 percent. All of these sections
relating to individual estimated income tax apply only as to tax
years beginning after December 31, 1954.
A new provision in the 1954 Code establishes an estimated
income tax filing by corporations. Section 6074 provides for the
filing of declarations of estimated tax by corporations on or before
the fifteenth day of the ninth month of the taxable year, except
that if the requirements are first met after the last day of the
eighth month and before the first day of the twelfth month of the
taxable year, the declaration is to be filed on or before the fifteenth
day of the twelfth month of the taxable year. The requirements for
filing referred to in that section are contained in Section 6016. and
are to the effect that every corporation subject to the income tax
provisions of the 1954 Code shall make a declaration of estimated
tax for the taxable year if its income tax liability for such taxable
year, reduced by the amount which the corporation estimates as
the sum of any credits against tax provided by the 1954 Code, can
reasonably be expected to exceed $100,000. These provisions are
applicable only with respect to taxable years ending on or after
December 31, 1955.
Under Section 6154, the amount of the advanced payment of
income tax by corporations through the filing of declarations of
estimated tax begins with 10 per cent of the estimated tax for the
year ending after December 31, 1955; for the year ending on or
after December 31, 1956, it increases to 20 per cent; the following
year it becomes 30 per cent; the next 40 per cent; and 50 per cent
for taxable years ending on or after December 31, 1959. Generally,
these advance payments will be due in two equal installments to be
pai-d on or before the fifteenth day of the ninth and twelfth months
of the taxable year. There is a provision in Section 6655 for an
addition to the tax in case of an underpayment of estimated tax by
a corporation. The addition for underpayment of any installment
is the same as that provided for in individuals. These additions
to the tax as well as similar additions to the tax on individuals may
be avoided if certain conditions are met. These conditions will
differ somewhat between individuals and corporations and will be
determined and disseminated by regulations at an early date. All
of these sections relating to corporation declarations of tax apply
only to tax years ending on or after December 31, 1955.
CREDITS AND EXEMPTIONS
A new concept is presented by Section 37. This section grants
an individual a credit against his tax liability equal to the tax at
the first bracket rate on the amount of his retirement income up to
$1200. In case of an individual who has reached the age of sixty-
five, the term retirement income includes pensions, annuities, in-
DICTA
March, 1955
terest, rent and dividends. In the case of an individual who has
not attained the age of sixty-five, the term retirement income only
includes income from pensions and annuities under a public retire-
ment system.
In computing the credit, the amount of retirement income up
to $1200 is reduced by any social security, railroad retirement,
military retirement pension or other retirement pension which is
excluded from gross income. A person who has not reached the
age of seventy-five may earn up to $900 a year as an employee or
in self-employment without reducing the amount of the retirement
credit. However, earnings in excess of $900 reduce dollar for
dollar the amount of retirement income on which the credit is based.
Thus, if the individual earnings equal $2100, he receives no tax
credit on his retirement income. For an individual who has reached
the age of seventy-five, there is no reduction on account of income
earned. The credit is restricted to individuals who have had earn-
ings of at least $600 a year in each of any ten years prior to the
taxable year. Where both husband and wife meet this requirement,
each can qualify for the credit. A widow whose spouse would qual-
ify under this requirement is herself qualified. This section applies
only to taxable years beginning after 1953, except short years end-
ing in 1954 on or before the date of enactment.
Another new credit is provided by Section 34. This section
provides for a credit against the income tax of an individual of
4 per cent of the dividends received from domestic corporations
which are included in gross income. This credit applies only to
taxable years ending after July 31, 1954, and to dividends received
after that date. The application of this credit must take into ac-
count the exclusion of dividends received as provided in Section
116 of the code. Section 116 provides for an exclusion from gross
income of $50 of the dividends first received in a taxable year. A
husband and wife filing a joint return will each have such an ex-
clusion where each receives enough dividends. This section applies
only to taxable years ending after July 31, 1954, but it applies to
dividends received in such years without regard to the date of
receipt.
Several changes in credits and exemptions appear in Sections
151 and 152 relating to deductions for personal exemptions. Under
Section 151 (e), it is now provided that an exemption of $600 may
be claimed for each dependent who is a child of the taxpayer and
who either has not attained the age of nineteen years at the close
of the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer
begins, or is a student. For this purpose, a child is now defined as
an individual who is a son, stepson, daughter or stepdaughter of
the taxpayer, and a student is defined as an individual who, dur-
ing each of five calendar months during the calendar year in which
the taxable year of the taxpayer begins, is a full-time student at an
educational institution or is pursuing a full-time course of institu-
tional on-the-farm training under prescribed supervision.
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The changes in Section 152 which define dependents are prin-
cipally these: A dependent now includes an individual who, for
the taxable year of the taxpayer, has as his principal place of abode
the home of the taxpayer and is a member of the taxpayer's house-
hold and over half of whose support is supplied by the taxpayer;
or, an individual who is a descendent of a brother or sister of the
father or mother of the taxpayer and who, for the taxable year of
the taxpayer, receives institutional care required by reason of a
physical or mental disability and who, before receiving such in-
stitutional care, was a member of the same household as the tax-
payer. The provisions of the prior law which recognized as an
adopted child one whose adoption was denied because the mental
incapacity of the natural parent prevented parental approval of
the adoption do not appear in the 1954 Code, so that only a legally-
adopted child may be treated as a child of the taxpayer by blood.
This apparent change in recognition is cured by the general pro-
vision that any individual who for the taxable year has as his prin-
cipal place of abode the household of the taxpayer, is a member
thereof, and over half of whose suport is supplied by the taxpayer,
may be a dependent.
The recognition of dependents who are aliens residing outside
the United States has been broadened by adding the Canal Zone
and the Republic of Panama to the former provision covering
Canada and Mexico, also certain children born to or adopted by
members of our armed forces in the Philippine Islands.
Another new provision in Section 152 relates to an individual
over half of whose support has been furnished by a group of per-
sons, no one of whom furnished over half of the dependent's sup-
port. The members of this group now may agree among them-
selves in writing as to which member of the group, who must him-
self have paid over 10 per cent of the dependent's support, may
claim the exemption in each year. An additional change in this
section provides that amounts received by a student who is a son,
stepson, daughter or stepdaughter of the taxpayer, as scholarships
for study in an educational institution shall not be taken into ac-
count in determining whether such individual received more than
half of his support from the taxpayer. These sections relating to
dependents are applicable to taxable years beginning after 1953,
except short years ending on or before the date of enactment.
TAX RATES
This deals with Section 1 and 2 of the 1954 Code. Section 1
combines the former normal tax and surtax into an income tax at
rates ranging from 20 per cent to 91 per cent, with a maximum
rate limitation of 87 per cent. Section 35 of the code provides a
3 per cent credit against tax with respect to partially tax-exempt
interest and thereby preserves the exemption of such interest from
normal tax. Under subsection (c) of Section 1, the normal tax
is retained at the 3 per cent rate, although ordinarily it does not
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have to be separately computed. This section also provides for an
income tax on heads of households based upon the same rates of
20 per cent to 91 per cent, but extending to the head of household
the same advantage as previously, amounting to about half the
benefit of the split income privilege. It adds a new provision that
an individual will be considered the head of a household and en-
titled to exemption for his parents if he maintains a household for
them even though it is not the taxpayer's household.
Section 2 of the code now provides that a surviving spouse
may take advantage of the split income provision for two whole
taxable years after the year in which the spouse died, providing the
surviving spouse maintains at his or her home a household which
is the principal place of abode of a son, stepson, daughter or step-
daughter, with respect to whom the taxpayer is entitled to a de-
pendent's deduction. The taxpayer is not considered to be a sur-
viving spouse if he or she has remarried during this period, or
if he or she was not entitled to file a joint return for the year in
which the spouse died. These sections relating to individual tax
rates pertain to tax years beginning after 1953, except short years
ending in 1954 on or before the date of enactment.
With respect to tax rate on corporations, Section 11 continues
the present normal tax of 30 per cent and the surtax rate of 22
per cent on corporations for taxable years beginning before April
1, 1955, including taxable years ending after March 31, 1954. It
reduces the normal tax rate to 25 per cent for taxable years begin-
ning after March 31, 1955.
Section 21 provides a general rule for all taxpayers as to
changes in rates for taxable years beginning after January 1, 1954.
Tentative taxes will be computed by applying rates in effect before
and after the change to the taxable income for the entire taxable
year. The tax liability will be the sum of the proportions of each
tentative tax which the number of days before and after the change
bears to the number of days in the full taxable year.
Practice and procedure changes under Chapter 63, relating to
assessments and refunds, include Section 6201 which authorizes
the acceptance of checks or money orders in payments for stamps,
but only to the extent provided in regulations and provides that if
any such checks or money orders are not duly paid when pre-
sented, the unpaid amount may be immediately assessed against
the taxpayer. It further authorizes the recovery by assessment of
any erroneous income tax prepayment credits in the same manner
as in the case of a mathematical error on the return.
Section 6203 provides that assessment shall be made by re-
cording the taxpayer's liability in any manner provided by regula-
tions; that is, it permits the use of machine operations or other
modern methods. It further provides that the taxpayer, upon re-
quest, shall be furnished a copy of the record of the assessment.
These two sections are effective as of January 1, 1955, with respect
to taxes imposed by both the 1939 and 1954 codes.
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One more section relating to assessments is of interest. Sec-
tion 6213 provides that any amount paid as a tax or in respect to a
tax may be assessed upon the receipt of such payment. In other
words, an advance payment of income, estate or gift taxes may be
assessed upon receipt even though the taxpayer has not signed a
waiver agreeing to the assessment or though the statutory notice
of deficiency has not been mailed to the taxpayer. The effective
date of this section is the day after enactment, but it is limited to
taxes imposed under the 1954 code. It will be made operative by
the issuance of regulations.
COLLECTIONS
This is covered in Chapter 64. Section 6303 now provides
that Notice and Demand for tax shall be made as soon as prac-
ticable and within sixty days after the making of an assessment
of tax. It also provides that except in the case of jeopardy, pay-
ment may not be demanded prior to the last date prescribed for
payment of such tax. This section, as well as all of the remaining
sections of this chapter, are effective January 1, 1955, with respect
to taxes imposed by both the 1939 and 1954 codes. They will,
however, become operative upon the issuance of regulations or
operating instructions.
Under Section 6311, checks or money orders may be received
in payment of any internal revenue tax including payment for in-
ternal revenue stamps. Under Section 6312, Treasury bills, notes,
and certificates of indebtedness are acceptable in payment of in-
ternal revenue taxes or stamps. Section 6316 will permit the pay-
ment of taxes in the currency of a foreign country under certain
circumstances. These provisions will become operative only to the
extent provided in regulations.
Section 6322 provides that the lien imposed for unpaid tax
shall arise at the time the assessment is made.
Section 6323 (b) now makes it clear that the filing of the
Notice of Lien shall be valid notwithstanding any law of the state
or territory regarding form or content of Notice of Lien, if the
notice is in a form which would be valid if filed with the Clerk of
the United States District Court. This should eliminate all ques-
tions concerning the validity of Federal tax liens as against mort-
gagees, pledgees, and judgment purchasers where Notice of Lien is
filed in an office designated by the state law even though it does
not comply in form or content with such state law.
Section 6323 (d), to the extent provided in regulations, will
permit the disclosure of information as to the amount of the out-
standing obligation secured by the lien to certain interested persons
other than the taxpayer.
Section 6325 clarifies prior law with respect to partial dis-
charges so that now it is established that a partial discharge may
be issued if the interest of the United States in the property to be
discharged has no value.
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Section 6332 answers a question left open in prior law as to
the amount of interest for which a person is liable if he fails to
surrender property levied upon. The interest rate is established by
this section as 6 per cent per annum from the date of levy.
Section 6334 modernizes the list of property exempt from
levy. It now exempts wearing apparel and school books necessary
for the taxpayer or members of his family, without specific value
limitation, but intended to cover necessities rather than luxuries.
It also exempts, in the case of the head of a family, fuel, pro-
visions, furniture, personal effects, arms for personal use, live-
stock and poultry, not exceeding $500 in value, as well as books
and tools necessary for the trade, business or profession of the
taxpayer not exceeding $250 in value.
Section 6335 removes the distinction between real and per-
sonal property insofar as the sale of seized property is concerned.
The time of sale is now fixed at not less than ten days nor more
than forty days from the time of giving public notice of sale.
Formerly, the period as to personal property was ten to twenty
days, and for real property, twenty to forty days. An additional
provision permits the mailing of the Notice of Sale to the last ad-
dress of the delinquent person if he cannot be readily located or
has no dwelling or place of business within the Internal Revenue
District. This section further provides that the Notice of Seizure
and the Notice of Sale may be given simultaneously, or the Notice
of Sale may be given at a later date. However, such notice must
now state the manner and conditions of the sale as well as its time
and place. The place of sale now may be anywhere within the
county where the property was seized. Sales now may be con-
ducted as public auctions or as public sales under sealed bids.
The former provision that the entire amount of the highest bid was
payable at the time of sale has now been modified to permit a
partial down payment and the subsequent payment of the balance
within a month. If the balance of the bid is not paid on time, the
part payment may be forfeited and the property may be resold
or the purchaser may be sued for the unpaid balance with interest
at 6 per cent. These provisions will become operative only to the
extent provided in regulations.
Section 6336 provides for the immediate sale of seized prop-
erty if it consists of perishable goods or is liable to be greatly re-
duced in price or value by keeping it, or if it cannot be kept with-
out great expense. In such event, the taxpayer is to be given an
immediate oportunity to pay the appraised value or give bond for
such payment and the property will be returned to him; otherwise,
it will be sold.
Section 6338 now requires the giving of a "Certificate of
Sale" to the purchaser in lieu of the present "Certificate of Pur-
chase." A deed will be given, in accordance with the state law, to
a purchaser of real property which is not redeemed.
Section 6339 includes a change with respect to the sale of
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motor vehicles seized for taxes. It provides that the public official
charged with registration of title to motor vehicles shall record
the transfer in his records upon receiving notice of a Certificate
of Sale.
Section 6343 now provides that a levy may be released and the
seized property returned to the taxpayer if it is determined that
such action will facilitate the collection of the tax liability. All
of these sections relating to collection procedures are effective
January 1, 1955, with respect to taxes imposed by both the 1939
and 1954 codes, and will be implemented by regulations.
Abatements, credits and refunds are covered by Chapter 65.
Section 6402 (a) changes the prior law to permit the crediting of
interest on an overpayment against any outstanding liability for
any tax. This section is effective January 1, 1955, as to taxes
imposed by both the 1939 and 1954 codes.
Section 6411 now permits the application of any overpayment
resulting from the allowance of a tentative net operating loss carry-
back adjustment as a credit against any tax then due, whereas
under prior law such overpayment could be credited only against
income, war profits and excess profits taxes. The effective date
of this section is January 1, 1955. After that date it will apply
both to taxes imposed by the 1954 code and to taxes imposed by
the 1939 code.
Section 6415 extends to admissions and dues taxes the same
rule previously applied to communications, transportation and
safety deposit box taxes, with respect to the credit or refund of
overpayments of such tax being permitted when it is established
that the tax was repaid to the person from whom it was collected
or the written consent of such person to the credit or refund was
secured.
Section 6416 similarly extends such refund provision to
cabaret taxes. This section also provides for a determination of
overpayment of tax in connection with diesel fuel, pistols and
revolvers in the event of certain price adjustments between the
seller and purchaser.
LIMITATIONS
Section 6501, in chapter 66, covers limitations on assessment
and collection. A detailed explanation of the numerous provisions
of this section is now under preparation in the national office and
since the limitations apply only to taxes imposed by the 1954 code,
and hence are not of immediate concern, it is not believed advisable
to take the time necessary to mention the numerous changes of
phraseology from the prior law. We will all have ample time to
become familiar with these limitations before they become of im-
mediate concern to us.
Section 6502 prescribes a method of extending the limitation
period of six years within which collection may be made after
assessment of the tax. In view of the provisions of Section 6343
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which I referred to a few moments ago and which provide that a
levy may be released, it is now authorized that if a levy is made
prior to the expiration of the six-year period, such levy may be
released subsequent to the six-year period, and if, in consideration
of such release, the taxpayer agrees to extend the statute, then
the statute will remain open and allow future levies on all prop-
erty of the taxpayer. The effective date of Section 6502 is the day
after the date of enactment. However, related Section 6343 is not
effective until January 1, 1955, hence an agreement may not be
secured after the expiration of the statutory period but before the
release of levy after January 1, 1955.
Section 6503 provides for a suspension of the statute of limi-
tations as to collections until six months after the termination
of court proceedings under which the assets of the taxpayer are
in the control or custody of the court. This section was effective
the day after enactment, but only with respect to taxes imposed
by the 1954 code.
Section 6511 (a) extends to all taxes required to be reported
on returns the provisions of the prior law with respect to the period
of limitations for credit or refund of income taxes, which was three
years from the time the return was filed or two years from the
time the tax was paid, whichever expires the later. Thus, the
same rules now apply to alcohol and tobacco taxes, excise taxes,
railroad retirement taxes and federal unemployment tax. This
three-year rule for taxes payable by return is measured only from
the original due date without regard to any extension of time,
whereas prior law allowed three years from the actual date of fil-
ing of a late return. As to stamp taxes, the period is reduced from
four years to three years from the time the tax was paid.
Subsection (c) of 6511 extends to all taxes, except estate taxes,
the rule previously applicable to income tax that the period of limi-
tation for credit or refund shall not expire prior to the end of six
months after any extension of the period for assessment, agreed
upon between the taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service.
Subsection (d) is new. It provides a special ten-year period
of limitation with respect to overpayments resulting from foreign
taxes paid or accrued which may be claimed as a credit against
the Federal income tax.
Subsection (e) changes from one year to two years the period
within which claims may be filed for refund of excise tax on manu-
factured sugar where the sugar is used for livestock feed or for
distillation of alcohol.
Sections 6513 and 6532 contain a large number of provisions
relative to the period of limitations on refund or credit of taxes
imposed by the 1954 code. They will not become operative until
after several years have elapsed and in the meantime will be inter-
preted in detail. It is not believed advisable to take time now to




Section 6601 eliminates the charging of interest on unpaid
interest items. For example, under prior law, interest charged
during a period of extension of time for payment began to bear
interest on the date the extension ended. Also, under the prior law,
in the case of deficiencies in income, estate or gift taxes, interest
ran from the date prescribed for the payment of the tax to the
date of assessment of the deficiency, and then interest on the
amount assessed ran from the date of such assessment. Under
Section 6601, there will be no interest on interest, nor will there be
the 5 per cent penalty for failure to pay miscellaneous taxes im-
posed by Section 3310 of the 1939 code.
In the case of stamp taxes which were not paid, there was no
provision for interest under the prior law. Under Section 6601,
interest will run from the date the liability for the tax arose. A
6 per cent interest provision in this section supersedes the pro-
vision in prior law for 3 per cent interest in the case of extensions
of time to certain corporations expecting carry-backs. An excep-
tion to the general 6 per cent rule is provided for estate tax liabili-
ties shown on the return as filed where an extension of time within
which to make payment is granted, in which case a 4 per cent rate
is charged.
An additional provision of the section is that if Notice and
Demand is made for payment of tax, and if the amount demanded
is paid within ten days after such Notice and Demand, interest will
not be imposed upon such amount for the period subsequent to the
date of the Notice and Demand.
Section 6611 provides that if any overpayment of income tax
is refunded within forty-five days after the last date prescribed for
filing the return, no interest will be allowed on such overpayment.
It also provides that interest will not be allowed on an overpayment
caused by a carry-back for the period prior to the close of the tax-
able year in which the net operating loss arises. These sections in
Chapter 67 became effective the day after the enactment, but apply
only to the taxes imposed by the 1954 code.
ADDITIONS TO THE TAX, ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS
AND ASSESSABLE PENALTIES
Section 6651 brings together and harmonizes various prior
provisions relating to additions to the tax for failure to file a re-
turn. The prior rules aplying to income, estate and gift taxes now
have been extended to other taxes so that a showing of reasonable
cause for failure to file a return may be established whether or not
the return ever has been filed. It also provides that additions to the
tax will be computed on the net amount due on the return rather
than on the gross amount of tax required to be shown on the return
as was previously true of several classes of tax. The penalty for
failure to file continues as before on the basis of 5 per cent if the
failure is for not more than one month, with an additional 5 per
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cent for each additional month or fraction, not exceeding 25 per
cent in the aggregate.
Section 6652 is new. It provides for a penalty of $1 for each
required information return such as Form 1099, or W-2 required
to be attached to Form 941 for the last quarter of the year, which
was not filed. The maximum amount to be paid for any one cal-
endar year in the case of any one person is $1,000.
Section 6653 provides that the fraud penalty shall be 50 per
cent in the case of all taxes, whereas prior law provided a 100 per
cent penalty in the case of stamp taxes. It also provides that the
50 per cent fraud penalty is to be computed on the amount of the
deficiency in the case of income, estate and gift taxes if the return
was filed timely. If the return was delinquent, the total amount
of tax determined to be due is the base for the fraud penalty. For
all other classes of tax, except stamp taxes, where the return is
timely filed, the amount of the underpayment is the difference be-
tween the total amount of tax finally determined to be due and the
amount of tax shown by the taxpayer on his return, plus any
amount paid but not shown on the return, less any rebates. How-
ever, if the return was delinquent, then the amount of the under-
payment is the difference between the total amount of tax finally
determined to be due and the amount paid but not shown on the
return filed by the taxpayer, less any rebates. Basically the two
provisions get the same result of finding the net underpayment.
In the case of stamp taxes, the addition to the tax for fraud is 50
per cent of the total amount of underpayment of tax. This section
further provides that no delinquency penalties may be asserted
if additions have been made to the tax on account of fraud. Negli-
gence penalties at the rate of 5 per cent apply only to income and
gift taxes and are computed on the underpayment in the same
manner as the fraud penalty.
All three of these sections relating to penalties are effective
on the day after enactment and apply to taxes imposed by the 1954
code.
Section 6654 relates to failure by an individual to pay his
estimated income tax. Instead of the penalties under Section
294(d) of the 1939 code, there is now provided a single addition
of 6 per cent per annum, which may be avoided under certain con-
ditions, computed from the due date of each installment on the
difference between the amount paid and 70 per cent of the amount
which should have been paid. In the case of farmers this per-
centage is 66 2/3 per cent. For purposes of applying this section,
the estimated tax is to be computed without any reduction for the
amount which the individual estimates as his credit for tax with-
held at the source on wages, and the amount of such credit actually
allowed for the taxable year shall be deemed a payment of esti-
mated tax. An equal part of such amount shall be deemed paid
on each installment date for such taxable year unless the taxpayer
establishes the dates on which all amounts were actually withheld,
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in which case the amounts so withheld shall be deemed payments
of estimated tax on the dates on which such amounts were actually
withheld. This section applies to years beginning after December
31, 1954.
Section 6655 provides a similar addition to the tax in the case
of failure. by a corporation to pay its estimated income tax. This
addition to the tax may be avoided under certain conditions, which
will be clarified by the issuance of instructions in the near future.
This section pertains to taxable years ending on or after December
31, 1955.
Section 6656 imposes a penalty for the failure without reason-
able cause to comply with the depositary receipt system. The pen-
alty is 1 per cent of the amount of the underpayment of the deposit
for each month or part of a month during which the underpayment
continues, but not to exceed 6 per cent in the aggregate. Under the
system of quarterly returns with monthly deposits, the maximum
penalty will not exceed 3 per cent, and it may be avoided if reason-
able cause is established. This section applies to taxes under the
1954 code.
Section 6657 provivdes a penalty for giving the Internal
Revenue Service a bad check in payment of any tax. The penalty
amounts to 1 per cent of the amount of the bad check, except that
if the amount of the bad check is less than $500, the penalty shall
be $5 or the amount of the check, whichever is the lesser. The pen-
alty will not be asserted if the person tendering the check did so
in good faith and had reasonable cause to believe that it would be
paid on presentation. This section also applies only with respect to
taxes imposed by the 1954 code.
Section 6672 relates to the failure to collect and pay over
those classes of tax which are required to be collected or withheld
by the taxpayer. The penalty prescribed in this section is 100 per
cent, and in those cases where it is applicable, the fraud and negli-
gence penalties provided by Section 6653 will not apply. This sec-
tion became effective on the day after enactment but is limited
to taxes imposed under the 1954 code.
ATTENTION SUBSCRIBER!
As announced in the July issue, the 30 year subject-author
index to DICTA is ready for your use. The students and attorneys
who have compiled the information feel that this publication will
be an invaluable aid in your library. This 85 page booklet, at a
printing cost to us of $2.00, is being made available to you as a
service of DICTA with no attempt to profit therefrom.
Please mail all checks to Mr. Spiro Nickolas, University of
Denver College of Law, with the checks made to the University
of Denver.
We sincerely solicit your support.
Thank you,
JOHN PHILLIP LINN, Managing Editor.
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BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS UNDER THE
1954 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
ADDISON B. CLOHOSEY$
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 continues all the deduc-
tions that were available to businessmen under the 1939 code, but
liberalizes some of them, and even does a little tightening up here
and there.
In discussing the changes in the business deduction provisions,
it is my purpose to be as sketchy as possible in describing the pro-
visions and to emphasize the value of these changes to your clients.
The most liberal laws in the world are of no benefit to you unless
you make them work for you. I'll tell you what the changes are,
but I'm more anxious to tell you how to make them work.
The deduction change with the broadest application and the
best features for immediate tax savings is that relating to depre-
ciation.
The 1954 code permits the use of any method that could be
used under the 1939 code. It also permits you to depreciate new
equipment according to any of the following methods:
(1) Declining balance at double the straight-line rate;
(2) The sum-of-the-years' digits; and
(3) Any other reasonable method in which the aggregate
amount of depreciation taken in any year during the first two-
thirds of the life of the facility does not exceed the amount that
would have been permitted under the new declining balance method.
(4) As a fourth alternative, you may enter into a formal
agreement with the Commissioner, setting forth the estimated use-
ful life of the facility and thus the rate of depreciation you can take
on it. This agreement may not be changed by either party unless
evidence is brought out that was not available to the parties at the
time the agreement was made.
We weren't sure how the sum-of-the-years' digits method would
work in relation to property purchased or acquired during the
year, but the proposed regulation would provide for apportioning
the deduction. Thus, if you acquire a ten-year facility on October
1 of the first year you are using this method, instead of taking
10/55 of the value in the first year, you would take 3/12 of 10/55
in the first year, 9/12 of 10/55 and 3/12 of 9/55 in the second year,
and so on.
It is important to note that the accelerated depreciation meth-
ods apply only to new equipment that has not heretofore been sub-
ject to depreciation. It does not apply to secondhand property,
even though it has never been depreciated before; thus, if you turn
your residence into a factory, you may not use the new methods.




The new methods apply only to facilities acquired, constructed
or re-constructed after 1953. If the construction or reconstruction
was begun in 1953 and finished in 1954, the new methods apply only
to the portion finished in 1954.
The new methods do not apply to any asset with an estimated
useful life of less than three years.
Once you qualify for any of the new methods, you may use
any combination of them for different assets or different classes of
assets. By "classes" we mean any classification into which you put
the assets, rather than a functional grouping.
In order to use any of the new methods all you do is compute
your depreciation under the new method for the first taxable year
after 1953 in which you have property eligible for the new method.
You don't have to make an election.
Now what are the tax advantages involved in the use of the
stepped-up depreciation methods?
(1) They enable you to buy new equipment, rather than sec-
ondhand equipment, and at the end of the first year the difference
in cost will be negligible because of the high first-year write-off.
(2) You will be able to buy new equipment whether or not
you have the cash for it.
(a) Banks which heretofore gave you the brush-off will
be glad to make loans on productive facilities, because they
know that the accelerated depreciation will enable you to pay
off the loan while the facility still has value as collateral.
(b) You can afford it because the short-term financing
will be less expensive than the long-term.
(3) You can use the new methods to convert ordinary income
into capital gain. For example, assume an asset worth $10,000
with a ten-year life. Under the declining balance method you could
depreciate such asset $4,880 in the first three years. But your
facility is still worth $7,000 and you sell it for that. You have a
capital gain of $1,880 (the difference between the $7,000 you
received and the $5,120 to which you had depreciated the facility),
but the same $1,880 was the difference between the new and the
old depreciation deductions which was taken against ordinary in-
come. Thus, ordinary income is reduced to capital gains.
Depletion is a deduction in which there wasn't much change
made, but what there was is a liberalization.
Cost depletion is continued as under the 1939 code, except that
the new code provides for apportionment in estates. The depletion
deduction is apportioned between the estate and the heirs, legatees
and devisees on the basis of the estate income allocable to each.
Discovery depletion is eliminated because all wasting materials
are now subject to percentage depletion.
Percentage depletion has been extended to include all wasting
minerals under a catch-all clause which allows "all other minerals"
(but those specifically named) 15 per cent depletion, unless the
mineral is used for rip rap, ballast, road material rubble, concrete
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aggregates, etc., when the rate is 5 per cent. This use test applies
only to the mine owner or operator and not to subsequent users.
The new law includes uranium at 23 per cent and creates a
new group of strategic and critical minerals, most of which were
heretofore depletable at 15 per cent, but are now allowed 23 per
cent if produced from domestic sources. It applies also to waste
or residue, such as mine tailings.
We get some breaks in the treatment of losses and loss carry-
overs and carry-backs.
Before we get into a discussion of the carry-over and carry-
back provisions, let's just mention in passing two benefits we de-
rive from the new treatment of losses:
(1) Theft losses will now be deductible only in the year in
which discovered, rather than in the year the loss was incurred as
under the old law. No doubling.
(2) As under the old law, losses on stocks, bonds or other
securities of an affiliated corporation are ordinary losses and not
capital losses. However, the new law liberalizes the provision in
that one of the requirements of the old law was that at least 90
per cent of the aggregates of the subsidiary's gross income be from
business operations. Under the new law "gross income" is changed
to "gross receipts," so that the test for business income is 95 per
cent of gross receipts. But, gross receipts from the sale of stock
or securities are defined by law as only the gain from such sales.
Therefore, the gain from the sale of securities becomes a smaller
proportion of the affiliate's gross receipts, and to that extent the
provision is liberalized.
The net operating loss deduction has been liberalized in several
ways:
(1) An operating loss for a tax year ending after 1953 can
now be carried back two years, instead of one. Thus, a taxpayer
with heavy Korean War profits in 1952 could recover some of the
taxes paid then, if he had an operating loss in 1954. However, you
can't use the new provision to recover excess profits taxes. Thus,
a 1954 net operating loss could recover only income taxes in 1952
and income and excess profits taxes in 1953.
(2) An individual in business now gets the same break that
corporations always had. That is, they can carry-back or forward
losses realized on sales of machinery, buildings, etc. This includes
losses on sale of the whole business.
This right to carry-back losses on the sale of business assets,
plus the two-year carry-back, puts a premium on careful timing
of a sale of all or part of your business at a loss. If you had a poor
year in 1952 and a good one in 1953, the sale at a loss ought to be
postponed until 1955. On the other hand, if 1952 was your big
year, it would be a mistake to hold off selling this year in order to
get a better price in 1955. For example, suppose you had income
of $25,000 in 1952, no income in 1953. In 1954 you will break even
in your business operations but contemplate selling some machinery
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at a loss of $15,000. Should you wait until 1955, looking for a
better price, you would lose a recovery of the tax paid in 1952 on
the top $15,000 of your income.
(3) The adjustments that under the old law limited the carry-
back or carry-over are materially reduced in number. The old law
required us to make these adjustments in order to make sure that
only an economic loss was carried over or back, and not a loss that
was a loss only for tax purposes. The new law provides, generally,
that a taxpayer should be treated the same in a loss year as he is
treated in any other year.
Thus, whereas under the old law you had to adjust for de-
pletion allowances, tax-free interest, loss carry-overs and carry-
backs, capital gains and losses and nonbusiness deductions, under
the new law the adjustments for depletion and tax-free interest are
entirely eliminated, and the nonbusiness deduction adjustment is of
course liberalized in the manner we discussed relating to the sale
of business property.
Moreover, the 85 per cent dividend-received credit has become
a deduction instead of a credit and now may be included as part
of the loss which may be carried over or back. In fact we get an
even better break here, because in the loss year the 85 per cent
dividend deduction is computed without the over-all limitation of 85
per cent of taxable income. Thus, taxpayers in a loss year get a
better break than those in a profit year if the amount of dividends
received is greater than the amount of other income.
The new code premits amortization of corporate organization
expenses. The old law required that they be capitalized, and there
was no way of deducting them before the corporation was liqui-
dated. That was because there was no useful life. But the new
code provides a useful life. It is at least five years. You can elect
any period that is not shorter than five years, but the election must
be made by the time the return has to be filed (including extensions
of time for filing) for the year for which it is to apply. It won't
apply to any expenses paid or incurred prior to August 16, 1954.
Expenses that may be amortized include those which are di-
rectly incident to creating the corporation, such as legal fees, state
incorporation fees, expenses of temporary directors, cost of minute-
book, etc. But the expenses of issuing stock are not included.
The period amortization is fixed at the time of the election
and can't be changed thereafter. If you wait and elect to start to
amortize organization expenses in a year after the year the corpor-
ation was organized, you lose part of the deduction.
The old confusion as to whether to expense or capitalize re-
search and experimental expenses has been remo-ved, ,o-'by a clear
definition of what is a "capital expenditure" or what a "deductible
expense," but by the simple method of letting the taxpayer elect to
do it either way.
With the exception of exploration costs and the cost of acquir-
ing or improving real property or buildings, you may elect to de-
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duct any research or development expense whether or not it is a
normally deductible item. It does not matter whether or not the
expenditure results in depreciable property.
If the expenses are really capital expenses you have to elect
to deduct them. The election may be made without permission in
the first year in which such expenses are paid or incurred, and
which begins after 1953 and ends after August 16, 1954. Election
in any year after the first requires the Commissioner's permission.
Election without consent requires that a statement be attached to
the return, specifying the amount and type of each expenditure
and giving a detailed description.
In case you don't want to deduct such expenses in the year
paid or incurred, the new code gives you another election in respect
to costs which are properly capital in nature. These may be amor-
tized like corporate organization expenditures over a period of the
taxpayer's choosing, but not less than sixty months.
This latter election is not available for expenses of research
and experiments which result in depreciable or depletable property.
If they are capital items, they must be expensed under the first
election or amortized over the life of the item (not over the five-
year or optional period).
For example, suppose the research results in a patent and you
spend $15,000 for capital items. You elect to amortize over a sixty-
month period, starting in August, 1954, when you put the new
process into effect. In 1954 you can deduct $1,250 (five months at
$250). In 1955, 1956, 1957 and 1958 you can deduct $3,000 a year,
and in 1959 the remaining $1,750. Without the election, the patent
would have been amortizable over a seventeen-year period.
This is also an election but does not have to be made in the first
year. It can be made by the due date of the return (including ex-
tensions) in any year.
The new elections will permit smaller corporations without
established research and development programs to start them.
It can provide a worthwhile deduction in a high corporate in-
come year.
On the other hand, new corporations expecting slim earnings
in the early years will probably want to defer the expenses to
deduct from expected higher earnings later on.
The new code permits considerably liberalized deductions for
charitable contributions. You will probably hear from another
speaker on the increase in the limit an individual may give and,
also, the reduction in the holding period on unlimited contributions.
I want to confine my remarks to two features as they affect
strictly business people:
(1) Corporations are given a two-year carry-over of contri-
butions in excess of the 5 per cent limit in any year. However, the
carry-over, plus the contributions in the year to which it is car-
ried over, may not exceed 5 per cent of the corporate net income
for that year. The law is written a little peculiarly, and, while I
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think you may not get away with it, the law says that each carry-
over plus the charitable deduction for the year may not exceed the
5 per cent limit. It doesn't seem to preclude having two carry-overs,
and having one plus the current year's deduction equal one 5 per
cent, and the other plus the current year's deduction equal another
5 per cent.
(2) The net operating loss carry-back which under prior law
could reduce or wipe out a charitable contribution deduction in the
year to which carried back because it would reduce or wipe out
the taxable income of which the charitable contribution was a
percentage has been changed. Now carry-backs do not affect the
percentages, and no adjustment need be made for loss carry-backs.
This is not true of carry-overs. The charitable contribution limit
is still figured on income reduced by the carry-over.
The big break given to farmers under the new code is the
election to deduct expenses for soil and water conservation and
for the prevention of land erosion. Prior to this code. farmers had
to capitalize any expenditures for improvement to the land, and
because land can't be depreciated they had to wait until they sold
it to get back their improvement costs.
But under the new law the farmer may elect to expense, rather
than capitalize, such expenses as levelling; grading; terracing;
contour furrowing; construction, control and protection of diver-
sion channels and drainage ditches, earthen dams, water courses,
outlets and ponds; eradication of brush and planting of windbreaks.
The new election does not apply unless the expenditure is made
on land used in farming either before or after the expenditure was
made.
It does not apply to depreciable property, which must still be
capitalized and depreciated over its useful life. Included in this
list are items made of concrete, tile, metal or wood, such as tanks,
reservoirs, pipes, conduits, canals, dams (other than earthen
dams), wells and pumps.
It does not apply, and note this carefully, to expenditures that
would be deductible even without the election. You can still deduct
them and they aren't subject to the 25 per cent limitation. Thus,
items found deductible in the Collingwood case1 are deductible in
full without any election and without any limitation.
Which brings us to the limitation. The total deduction may
not exceed 25 per cent of the taxpayer's total income from farming
for the year in which the deduction is made. Now there are two
modifications of this:
( , 1) Any amount not usable in one year may be carried over
indefinitely but cannot be used in a succeeding year to an extent
that would make the deduction exceed 25 per cent of the income
from farming in that year.
(2) Income from farming means all farming done by the
TCollingwood v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. No. 132.
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taxpayer and is not limited to the farm on which the expenditures
are made.
No deduction may be taken in a year in which there is no
income from farming.
The amount not deducted because of the 25 per cent limitation
does not become part of the taxpayer's basis in the farm. In fact
if he sells that particular farm, the farmer can continue to carry-
over any unused deduction against any subsequent farm income
he may have. However, if he dies, or sells the farm and doesn't
have any farm income thereafter, any unused deduction is lost.
You have to make the election. If made in the first year start-
ing after 1953 and ending after August 16, 1954, you don't need
consent of the Commissioner. You just attach a statement to your
return specifying the amount of each type of expenditure and ex-
plaining it in detail. Once the election is made, you have to keep
on expensing such items in subsequent years unless you get per-
mission to change.
Any election made in a year subsequent to the first year in
which you have such expenditures requires permission.
This is another provision in the law which permits the tax-
payer to turn ordinary income into capital gain. Suppose you are
a farmer and your average income from farming is $20,000 a year.
You buy a piece of farm land that needs development or is run
down. You use it in connection with your farm operations and
spend $5,000 grading and levelling it. The following year you sell
it at a $5,000 profit. You have a $5,000 capital gain on which you
have to pay capital gains tax, but you also have a $5,000 deduction
right off the top of your $20,000 farm income.
Hobby losses are somewhat liberalized. Under the old law if
you sustained a loss of more than $50,000 in a business for each of
five consecutive years, you had to recompute your taxes for each
of the five years and limit the loss deductions to $50,000 in each
year.
The new code continues this, but it gives the taxpayer some
additional breaks in the computation of the $50,000 loss.
Under the old law you didn't count tax and interest deductions
in determining whether your losses were over $50,000. You could
deduct both, in addition to the $50,000 loss.
You still can, but now you have some more exceptions.
Casualty and abandonment losses, losses and expenses of farming
attributable to drought, and expenditures which you can elect
to deduct or capitalize are not included in computing the $50,000
loss and are deductible in addition to the $50,000. Net operating
loss carry-backs and carry-overs are not included in the computa-
tion of the $50,000 but are not deductible in addition to it.
These new "rules" of application may apply to prior years if
they are included in a group of five consecutive years which ends
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T. T. SHAW, C.P.A., New York
The space at my disposal does not permit a discussion of all
of the provisions pertaining to corporate distributions, liquidations
and reorganizations. I shall therefore concentrate on those provi-
sions which are of greatest general interest.
DISTRIBUTIONS By CORPORATIONS
Distributions of Property-Section 301
A distribution by a corporation of money or other property
is includable in income by the recipient to the extent it represents
a dividend, that is, to the extent it represents a distribution out of
earnings accumulated since March 1, 1913, or out of earnings of
the taxable year in which distributed.
The amount of the distribution to be accounted for by indi-
viduals and other non-corporate stockholders is the amount of
money plus the fair market value of other property received by
them.
A different rule applies to dividends received by corporations.
In the case of corporate stockholders, generally speaking, dividends
in kind are to be reported by them at the lesser of the fair market
value of the property distributed or its adjusted basis in the hands
of the distributing corporation.
Thus, a corporate stockholder receiving a distribution in
property ordinarily ignores any appreciation in its value over the
tax basis in the hands of the distributing corporation. On the other
hand, individuals and other non-corporate stockholders must take
such appreciation into account.
Distributions in Redemption of Stock-Section 302
This section provides special rules in relation to redemption
of stock for the purpose of determining when a redemption will
be taxed on a capital gain basis and when it will be taxed as a
dividend.
The redemption will be treated as a distribution in exchange
for stock and taxed on a capital gain basis where any one of the
following requirements is met:
(1) the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend;
(2) the distribution is substantially disproportionate;
(3) the redemption is in termination of the shareholder's
interest in the corporation; or
(4) the redemption is of stock issued by a railroad cor-
poration in a bankruptcy reorganization.
If a corporation redeems its stock and the redemption does
not fall within the requirements set forth above for treatment as
a payment in exchange for stock, the redemption will ordinarily
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be treated as a distribution of property to which Section 301 ap-
plies (i.e., taxable as a dividend).
Whether or not a redemption is essentially equivalent to a
dividend is to be determined from all the facts. This test is sub-
stantially the same as under Section 115(g) (1) of prior law.
If a redemption is determined not to be essentially equivalent
to a dividend, it will not matter whether or not the distribution is
substantially disproportionate or whether or not the redemption
is in termination of the shareholder's interest in the corporation.
A distribution will not be considered substantially dispropor-
tionate unless immediately after the redemption the shareholder
owns less than 50% of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote. A distribution, to be considered
substantially disproportionate, must also meet requirements with
respect to the reduction of the shareholder's interest in the cor-
poration. Immediately after the redemption the percentage of the
outstanding voting stock and all common stock (voting or non-
voting) owned by the shareholder must be less than 80% of the
percentage owned before.
If a shareholder owns only preferred stock (any kind), he
cannot, under the letter of the statute, meet the substantially dis-
proportionate interest test for the reason that this test requires
a reduction in common stock ownership as well as a reduction in
voting stock ownership. In such a case, except in complete termi-
nation, the redeeming shareholder must show that the redemption
is not substantially equivalent to a dividend.
Where a shareholder owns both common and preferred stock
and redeems a sufficient amount of common to meet the dispro-
portionate test, he should keep in mind that at the same time he
can, if he wishes, redeem all of his preferred. However, if he fails
to redeem all of his preferred at that time, in order to redeem
additional preferred at a later date he will have to redeem enough
additional common stock to meet the disproportionate test. This
does not apply to preferred stock which is Secction 306 stock (dis-
cussed later). If he redeems the Section 306 stock the proceeds
will be ordinary income unless the stockholder's interest is termi-
nated.
If a common shareholder purchases stock from other share-
holders shortly before he makes a redemption which on its face
would qualify as a disproportionate redemption, do you look at
the situation of all shareholders under the "series of transactions"
rule to determine if there is a disproportionate redemption? Con-
versely, suppose a shareholder, after meeting the disproportionate
redemption test with respect to the shares presently owned, ac-
quires from other shareholders a portion of their shares so that
his interest thereafter is substantially the same as it was before,
does he qualify under the disproportionate test? The answer to
these questions is uncertain.
A shareholder's interest is terminated if the distribution is
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in complete redemption of all the stock owned by such shareholder.
Although the constructive ownership provisions (Section 318) are
generally applicable, a special rule is provided which, under speci-
fied conditions, waives the constructive ownership test in the case
of a distribution in termination of a shareholder's interest. Under
this rule, stock owned by members of the family of a distributee
will not be attributed to him if immediately after the distribution
in redemption the distributee himself has no interest in the cor-
poration, including an interest as officer, director or employee,
other than an interest as a creditor, and if such distributee does
not acquire such interest (other than stock acquired by bequest or
inheritance) within ten years after the date of distribution in
redemption. The distributee must undertake to notify the Treasury
if and when he acquires an interest during such ten-year period.
In the event the distributee does acquire an interest in the
corporation (other than by bequest or inheritance) within ten
years after the date of distribution, the limitation period on as-
sessment and collection will, with respect to any deficiency re-
sulting from such acquisition, include one year following the date
the distributee files notice thereof with the Treasury. The year of
distribution, even if otherwise barred, will be held open for this
purpose. In determining a deficiency, credit will be allowed for
any capital gain tax paid upon termination of the interest of the
shareholder.
The above special rules waiving the constructive ownership
test will not apply under certain circumstances where tax avoid-
ance is involved.
Dispositions of Certain Stock-Section 306
Section 306 is an attempt to cure the defect in prior law which
permitted the type of "preferred stock bail-out" illustrated in
Chamberlin v. Commissioner.' In that case stockholders received
a nontaxable distribution of preferred stock on common stock, and
almost immediately sold the preferred to an insurance company.
The corporation then redeemed the preferred stock over a period.
The stockholders were permitted capital gain treatment under
prior law.
This secction contains a new term "Section 306 stock." In
general, Section 306 stock is stock issued on or after June 22, 1954,
as a stock dividend (other than common on common) whether in
connection with a corporate reorganization or otherwise, at a
time when the issuing corporation has earnings and profits.
The term "Section 306 stock" does not include stock, no part
of the distribution of which would have been a dividend at the
time of the distribution if money had been distributed in lieu of
stock. Thus, preferred stock received at the time of original in-
corporation would not be Section 306 stock. Also, stock issued at
the time an existing corporation had no earnings and profits
would not be Section 306 stock.
' 207 F. (2d) 462.
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It should be noted that Section 306(e) provides in effect that
the downgrading of Section 306 preferred stock into common stock
causes the stock to lose its character as Section 306 stock.
If Section 306 stock is sold to a purchaser for value, it is not
Section 306 stock in the hands of the purchaser.
It appears that a taxpayer could make a gift of Section 306
stock to someone in a lower income tax bracket and have that in-
dividual realize ordinary income. Also, gifts can be made to closely-
related individuals who are not in the area of constructive owner-
ship, and they can sell or redeem by a complete termination of
their interest and receive capital gain treatment. For example, a
shareholder could give Section 306 stock to his son-in-law who sells
or redeems all of it and pays only a capital gain tax. A gift of
Section 306 stock to a charity will give rise to a charitable deduc-
tion for the fair market value of the stock even though the value
of the stock has never been picked up in income.
We must now consider the treatment of Section 306 stock
when it is disposed of: (1) other than by redemption and (2) by
redemption.
(1) Treatment of disposition other than redemption. If a
shareholder sells or otherwise disposes of Section 306 stock, and
if such disposition is not a redemption, the amount realized (not
just the excess of the proceeds over the basis) will be treated as
gain from the sale of property which is not a capital asset. It ap-
pears that under these circumstances the basis of the Section 306
stock may be lost as there is no statutory provision for preserving
the basis. The Senate Committee report states that a pledge of
stock without personal liability will be treated as a disposition
within the meaning of Section 306.
The proceeds from a disposition of Section 306 stock will not
be treated as ordinary income, however, to the extent that such
proceeds exceed a ratable share of the amount which would have
been taxed as a dividend at the time of distribution if the cor-
poration had distributed money equal to the fair market value of
the stock instead of the Section 306 stock.
Example
Assume a shareholder owns 1,000 shares of the com-
mon stock of a corporation and that they are the only
shares of its stock outstanding. Assume also that the
shareholder acquired 1,000 shares of preferred stock with
a fair market value for each share of $100 issued to him
as a dividend on his common stock at a time when the
corporation had $100,000 of accumulated and/or current
earnings. Assume also that the basis allocable to the pre-
ferred stock is $30,000. There is no tax to the shareholder
at the time of receipt of the stock but it is characterized
as Section 306 stock. If it is sold for $100,000, the share-
holder will be taxed on the entire sale proceeds (not just
$70,000) at the rates applicable to ordinary income.
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If in the foregoing example the corporation had only $60,000
of accumulated (and current) earnings at the time of the distri-
bution of the stock dividend, then in the case of a sale of the Section
306 stock only $60,000 would be taxed as ordinary income (gain
from the sale of a non-capital asset). To the extent that the
remainder of the sale price exceeded the basis allocated to the
Section 306 stock, it would be treated as capital gain (long-term
or short-term) from the sale of such stock.
In the foregoing example it would be immaterial that a
$100,000 cash dividend was distributed to the stockholder on his
common stock subsequent to the distribution of the stock dividend.
The stock dividend would be Section 306 stock because of the cor-
porate earnings in existence at the time of its distribution. A share-
holder may, in such a case, avoid its inherent ordinary income
characteristics only by disposing of his Section 306 stock through
redemption by the issuing corporation at a time when it had no
accumulated or current earnings.
Any amount realized over the sum of (1) the amount treated
as gain from the sale of property which is not a capital asset and
(2) the adjusted basis of the stock will be treated as a capital
gain from the sale of such stock. If in the above example the stock
had been sold for $140,000 (instead of $100,000) and had a basis
of $30,000, $10,000 would have been taxed as a capital gain.
In no event will any loss be allowed with respect to the sale
of Section 306 stock.
(2) Disposition by redemption. If the disposition is a re-
demption as distinguished from a sale, the amount realized will be
treated as a distribution of property to which Section 301 applies,
that is, as a dividend distribution. It should give rise to a dividend
credit in the case of individuals or of a dividend deduction where
the recipient is a corporation. If a stock dividend were distributed
at a time when it qualified as Section 306 stock, but if there were
no corporate earnings, accumulated or current, at the time of re-
demption, the amount received on redemption would be treated
under Section 301 as a return of capital.
Other special rules: Notwithstanding that stock sold or re-
deemed is Section 306 stock, its disposition will not give rise to
ordinary income in any one of the following situations:
(1) If the disposition terminates a shareholder's interest.
(2) If the Section 306 stock is redeemed in a complete liqui-
dation or a partial liquidation (as defined in Section 346).
(3) To the extent that gain or loss to the shareholder is not
recognized with respect to the disposition of the Section 306 stock
(e.g., in a reorganization exchange).
(4) If it is established that the distribution and the disposi-
tion or redemption were not in pursuance of a plan having tax
avoidance as a principal purpose. This is to be applied on an indi-
vidual shareholder basis, e.g., a minority shareholder who exerfs
no control over the corporation would not ordinarily be deemed
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to have a purpose of -avoiding federal taxes by means of the distri-
bution, disposition, or redemption of any Section 306 stock. This
provision will cover many stock redemptions by publicly held
corporations.
If stock were received in a distribution or reorganization to
which prior law applied and would have been Section 306 stock
if the new law had applied to such distribution or reorganization
and if such stock is disposed of or redeemed on or after June 22,
1954, the new provisions will not apply in respect to such disposi-
tion or redemption. The extent to which such disposition or re-
demption will be treated as a dividend will be determined as if
prior law continued to apply. In such a case the test is whether
the facts are such as to make the redemption essentially equivalent
to a dividend, or to make the preferred stock taxable as a dividend
when issued.
Taxability of Corporation on Distribution-Section 311
This section incorporates into the statute the rule of General
Utilities & Operating Co.' that a corporation does not realize tax-
able income by reason of a distribution of property which has ap-
preciated in value.
There are three exceptions to this general rule, as follows:
(1) LIFO inventories. If a corporation inventorying goods
under the LIFO method distributes "inventory assets," the cor-
poration will be considered as having realized a gain on the sale
of such assets equal to the excess of the "inventory amount" of
such assets determined under a method of inventorying goods
other than the LIFO method over the "inventory amount" of such
assets determined under the LIFO method.
(2) Liabilities exceeding basis. Where property is distributed
to a shareholder and such property is either subject to a liability
or the shareholder assumes a liability of the corporation in con-
nection with the distribution, and the amount of such liability
exceeds the adjusted basis in the hands of the distributing cor-
poration of such property, gain will be recognized to the distribut-
ing corporation in an amount equal to the excess of the liability
over such adjusted basis. This rule has one limitation. Where the
property is merely subject to a liability (i.e., there is no assump-
tion of liability by any shareholder), gain to the corporation can-
not exceed the excess of the fair market value of the property over
its adjusted basis.
Example
If property which is a capital asset having an ad-
justed basis to the distributing corporation of $100 and a
fair market value of $1,000 (but subject to a liability of
$900) is distributed to a shareholder, such distribution is
taxable (as long- or short-term capital gain as the case
General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 200.
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may be) to the corporation to the extent of the excess of
the liability ($900) over the adjusted basis ($100) or
$800. If the property subject to the liability were not a
capital asset in the hands of the distributing corporation,
the gain would be taxable at rates applicable to ordinary
income.
(3) Installment obligations. Where installment obligations
are distributed to stockholders gain or loss is realized to the extent
of the difference between the basis of the obligations and their
fair market value (Section 453(d)).
The first two of the above three exceptions do not apply in
the case of a partial or complete liquidation (see Section 336).
Effect on Earnings and Profits-Section 312
This section for the first time sets forth a statutory rule as
to the appropriate adjustments to earnings and profits when
property which has appreciated or depreciated in value since ac-
quisition is distributed to shareholders.
In general, upon a distribution by a corporation with respect
to its stock, the earnings and profits of the corporation (to the
extent thereof) will be decreased by the sum of (1) the amount of
money, and (2) the adjusted basis of other property distributed.
For the purpose of taxing shareholders on the amount of
appreciation in inventory assets which are distributed as a divi-
dend, provision is made for an upward adjustment of earnings
and profits. Where the fair market value of inventory assets dis-
tributed exceeds the basis, the corporate earnings will be increased
by the amount of such excess, and will be decreased by the lesser
of the fair value of the assets distributed, or the earnings and
profits (so increased).
"Inventory assets," for purposes of this section, are defined
to mean (1) those items normally included in inventory and prop-
erty held primarily for sale to customers, and (2) unrealized re-
ceivables or fees.
Example
Corporation X distributes inventory assets with a
basis of $80 and a fair market vvalue of $100. Its earnings
and profits at date of distribution amount to $75. As a re-
sult of this distribution the earnings and profits will be
increased by the amount of appreciation ($20) to $95, and
will be reduced by the fair market value of the assets dis-
tributed, but not below zero. In this instance, therefore,
$95 of earnings and profits will be considered as having
been distributed.
This section (312) deals with the effect of distributions on
earnings and profits of the distributing corporation and does not
cover specifically the treatment by stockholders of such distribu-
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tions. Therefore, the application of such cases as Hirshon Trust
and Godley3 is not clear under the new law. Perhaps the best indi-
cation that these cases do not apply is the specific provision with
respect to treatment of appreciated inventory assets in relation
to earnings and profits, and the failure of Congress of provide for
similar treatment of property in general.
Provision is made for proper adjustment to earnings and
profits where property distributed is subject to a liability, or
where the distributee assumes a liability in connection with the
distribution, and for cases where gain is recognized to the dis-
tributing corporation under Section 311 as a result of distribution
of (1) LIFO inventory and (2) property subject to indebtedness
in excess of basis. These adjustments are to be detailed in regu-
lations.
CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS
Complete Liquidations of Subsidiaries-Section 332
This section corresponds to and in general restates Section
112(b) (6) of prior law except in two respects:
(1) There has been deleted a provision which appeared in
Section 112(b) (6) (A) which removed a liquidation from the
application of that section if the parent corporation decreased its
stockholdings in the subsidiary after the time of the adoption of
the plan of liquidation and before receipt of the subsidiary's prop-
erty. The Senate Committee Report states that this provision has
been removed with a view to limiting the elective features of the
section.
(2) A provision has been added to the effect that if the
liquidated subsidiary was indebted to its parent on the date of
adoption of the plan of liquidation no gain or loss will be recog-
nized to the subsidiary because of the transfer of property to the
parent in satisfaction of such indebtedness. Under prior law gain
or loss could be recognized in such cases.
The new code does not touch upon the problem of Houston
Natural Gas Corporation.4 In that case, Houston, having acquired
bonds of its subsidiary at a discount, liquidated the subsidiary,
acquiring all its assets and assuming all its liabilities. It was held
that the transfer of assets to the extent of the face value of the
bonds was not a "distribution in liquidation" and that Houston
realized taxable income to the extent of the excess of the face
amount of the bonds over their cost of acquisition. Under the new
code the same result would be reached, and the assets transferred
in satisfaction of the indebtedness would retain the same basis
the hands of the parent as they had in the hands Of the liqui-
dated subsidiary (Section 334(b) (1)).
I Commissioner v. Hirshon Trust, 213 F. (2d) 523 (2nd Cir. 1954); Commis-
sioner v. Godley's Estate, 213 F. (2d) 529 (3rd Cir. 1954).




As under prior law, unless the subsidiary is solvent there
cannot be a tax-free liquidation. In the case of an insolvent sub-
sidiary there is a bad debt (to the extent that debt, if any, of the
subsidiary to the parent is uncollectible by the parent) and a
worthless security (stock). The bad debt would be deductible, and,
if the subsidiary were 95% or more owned and certain other con-
ditions of Section 165 were complied with, the worthless stock
would also be deductible as an ordinary loss.
Only if the liquidation of the subsidiary is tax-free can losses
be carried over to the successor (parent) under Section 381. If
a subsidiary were insolvent Section 381 would not apply. It might
be advisable to contribute debt to the capital of a subsidiary to
avoid insolvency and then throw the liquidation under Section 332
in order that the provisions of Section 381 would apply.
Basis of Property Received in Liquidations-Section 334
This section incorporates the rule of prior law that the basis
of property received by a parent corporation in the tax-free liqui-
dation of a subsidiary (80% or more owned) will be the same as
the basis of the property in the hands of the subsidiary.
A similar rule is adopted with respect to transfers of property
by a subsidiary to its parent in satisfaction of indebtedness owing
to the parent at date of liquidation of the subsidiary. It is made
clear that no increase or decrease in the basis of such property
will result from the transfer.
The foregoing rule with respect to basis of property of liqui-
dated subsidiaries will not, however, apply in the case of a purchase
of stock by a corporation to acquire assets (Kimbeli-Diamond Mill-
ing type of acquisition and liquidation5 ). In that type of transaction
the basis of the property in the hands of the distributee will be the
same as the basis of the stock with respect to which the distribu-
tion was made, adjusted, however, for any distribution made to
the distributee with respect to the stock before the adoption of
the plan of liquidation, for any money received, for any liabilities
assumed or subject to which the property was received, and for
other items, e.g., gains and losses after acquisition of the subsidi-
ary.
For these suecial rules to apply, it is necessary that the dis-
tributee acquired by purchase (i.e., in a taxable transaction) dur-
ing a period of not more than twelve months, stock of the dis-
tributing corporation possessing at least 80% of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least
80% of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock
(except nonvoting stock which is limited and preferred as to
dividends). It is also necessary that the distribution be made pur-
suant to a plan of liquidation adopted on or after June 22, 1954,
6 Kimbell-Diamond Milling v. Commissioner, 187 F. (2d) 718.
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and not more than two years after the date of the acquisition of
the requisite amount of stock. If a straight liquidation were not
practicable, i.e., because of the existence of minority interests, a
statutory merger would probably be in order and produce the same
effect.
The new law, in thus providing for a stepped-up (or stepped-
down) basis for assets where stock is acquired in order to obtain
assets, codifies the rule of the Kimbell-Diamond Milling decision
and similar cases. The new code is somewhat more liberal than
the court-made rules under prior law and also lends certainty to
this type of transaction, since it does not require proof of an in-
tention to acquire assets. If a stepped-down basis were involved
or if carry-over benefits (Section 381) were desired, the taxpayer
could apparently avoid the provision, e.g., by postponing the liqui-
dation for more than two years. The new code does not cover ac-
quisitions by individuals (as distinct from corporations) such as
existed in the Snively case. 6
The law is not clear as to the date at which the cost of the
stock of the liquidated company will be allocated to the assets.
There are at least three possible dates: (1) date of purchase of
the stock, (2) date of adoption of plan of liquidation, and (3) date
of receipt of the assets. It should be noted that a Kimbell-Diamond
type of liquidation could extend over several years. The stock may
be acquired within a twelve-month period, and the plan of liqui-
dation may be adopted within two years after the acquisition of
the stock, and the liquidation itself may extend over a period of up
to three years.
It is not permissible to acquire stock for the purpose of a
Kimbell-Diamond type liquidation by purchasing it from persons
who are related within the constructive ownership rules, e.g., mem-
bers of a family, etc.
While the Kimbell-Diamond type liquidation can be accom-
plished where more than 80% of the stock of the required company
is purchased, the same result can be accomplished without resort
to Section 334 if only, say, 79% of the acquired company's stock
is purchased. In that event, the liquidation is a taxable one without
regard to Section 334, and the assets would be taken up by the
parent company at market value (which would presumably be
equal to the amount which was paid for the stock).
Effects on Corporation-Gain or Loss on Sales or Exchanges
in Connection with Certain Liquidations-Section 337
The purpose of this section is to overcome the hardship im-
posed by the Court Holding Company rule 7 and to eliminate the
uncertainty injected by the Cumberland Public Service decision 8
and similar cases. In general, the effect of this section is to limit
SSnively v. Commissioner, 19 T. C. 850.
Commissioner v. Court Holding Company, 324 U. S. 331.
'United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U. S. 451.
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the tax on any gain derived during liquidation to a single tax im-
posed on the shareholder and to eliminate tax on gain at the cor-
porate level.
Specifically, if a corporation adopts a plan of complete liqui-
dation on or after June 22, 1954, and within a period of twelve
months thereafter distributes all of its assets (less assets retained
to meet claims) in complete liquidation, no gain or loss will be
recognized to the corporation from the sale or exchange by it of
property within such twelve-month period. For purposes of this
section, the term "property" does not include inventory and other
property held by the corporation primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of business; nor does it include certain
installment obligations. However, while inventory and like prop-
erty is ordinarily not within the scope of the section, in any case
in which substantially all of the inventory and like property is, in
connection with the liquidation, sold to one person in one transac-
tion and no replacement thereof is made, the rule of non-recognition
of gain or loss to the corporation will apply.
If a corporation anticipated a loss upon a sale of its property
at the time it was contemplating liquidation, the corporation could
defer distribution of all its assets for more than the required
twelve-month period and in this event it would appear that ary
loss incurred upon disposition of property would be deductible
(but gains, if any, would be taxable).
The question had been raised as to whether the adoption of
the plan of liquidation and the sale of the assets could occur on
the same day. The feeling seems to be that this would be permis-
sible. However, it is thought advisable to have an interval between
the two events. One day would be sufficient.
It would seem inadvisable to set up reserves for contingent
liabilities. Instead, the assets should be distributed and the stock-
holders allowed to assume any risk that cannot be finally deter-
mined within the twelve-month period. If a reserve for a contin-
gent liability were set up and the liability did not materialize
there would be a serious question as to whether the conditions of
Section 337 had been complied with.
If a company has some property on which it will realize a gain
and other property on which it will incur a loss, it may think it
smart to sell the loss property before adopting a plan of liquidation
and then proceed to liquidate within a twelve-month period when
it has nothing but gain property. This idea may work, but on the
other hand it may not. The Internal Revenue Service may argue
that when the company sold the loss property this was a step to-
ward liquidation and a part of the plan, and the result may be that
either no gain or loss is recognized on any property if all is disposed
of within a twelve-month period or if the disposition period extends




Section 337 will not apply to any sale made by:
(1) a collapsible corporation as defined in Section 341 (b)
(2) a subsidiary being liquidated in a tax-free liquidation
under Section 332;
(3) a corporation being liquidated under the partially tax-
free provisions of Section 333 (which corresponds to the former
Section 112(b) (7)).
Partial Liquidation Defined-Section 346
This section provides rules for the determination of when a
distribution by a corporation will be considered to be one in partial
liquidation so that amounts distributed will be treated as in pay-
ment in exchange for the stock (taxable on capital gain basis),
rather than as a distribution of property in redemption of stock
which may possibly be treated as a dividend under Section 301.
The definition of partial liquidation appears to contemplate
a contraction of a corporate business and the Senate Committee
report states that primarily, the definition involves the concept of
"corporate contraction" as developed under prior law. However,
it is by no means certain that every transaction which qualifies
as a partial liquidation will necessarily involve a shrinking of the
corporate business.
Subsection (a) provides that a distribution will be treated as
in partial liquidation if it is one of a series in redemption of all
of the stock of a corporation pursuant to a plan, or if the distribu-
tion is not essentially equivalent to a dividend and is in redemption
of a part of the stock of a corporation pursuant to a plan of partial
liquidation and occurs within the taxable year in which the plan
is adopted or within the succeeding taxable year.
Subsection (b) illustrates one kind of distribution which will
be considered as being in partial liquidation. This subsection con-
templates that the distributing corporation must be engaged in
the active conduct of at least two businesses which have been
actively conducted (whether or not by it) for the five-year period
immediately before the distribution. None of such businesses may
have been acquired within such period in a transaction in which
gain or loss was recognized in whole or in part. Thus, a qualifying
business may not have been acquired within five years by purchase
or in a corporate reorganization where "boot" was present. If these
requirements are met, the assets of one of the active businesses
may be distributed in partial liquidation (or a distribution at-
tributable to cessation of such business may be made, e.g., distri-
bution of sales proceeds) as long as the corporation immediately
after the distribution continus in + he active conduct of the other
business or businesses.
There could be a situation where a parent company owns a
subsidiary in a different type of business and distributes the stock
of the subsidiary on the theory that this is a partial liquidation
under Section 346(b). This seems more likely to be treated as a
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spin-off under Section 355. Under that section no gain or loss
would be recognized on the distribution and the stock of the spun-
off company would take an allocated portion of the basis of the
parent's stock. This would not be so if the transaction were treated
as a partial liquidation. A partial liquidation would produce capital
gain or loss. It should be noted that if the transaction were treated
as a spin-off under Section 355 the more stringent rules of that
section would have to be met, such as proof that the distributions
were not substantially equivalent to a dividend.
There is clearly an overlapping between the partial liquidation
provision, Section 346, and the spin-off provision, Section 355.
CORPORATE ORGANIZATIONS AND REORGANIZATIONS
Transfer to Corporation Controlled by Transferor-Section 351
This section is similar to Section 112(b) (5) of prior law with
the following exceptions:
(1) The "proportionate interest" requirement which existed
in Section 112 (b) (5) has been eliminated.
(2) Unlike Section 112(b) (5), the new provision states spe-
cifically that stock or securities issued for services shall not be
considered as issued in return for property.
(3) Under prior law, if the transferors were corporations,
it was not clear whether or not a distribution of the stock received
by such transferors would prevent the application of the section
because of the requirement that the transferors be in 80% or more
control immediately after the exchange. The new provision ex-
pressly states that the fact that a corporate transferor distributes
part or all of the stock which it receives in the exchange to its
shareholders will not be taken into account for the purpose of de-
termining control. Such distribution would consequently not pre-
vent application of the section. (As to non-corporate transferors,
the "immediately after the exchange" requirement is still of im-
portance.)
While the "proportionate interest" requirement has been
eliminated, the Senate Committee report states that in any case
in which stock and securities received are not in proportion, the
transaction will be treated as if the stock and securities had first
been received in proportion and then some of such stock and securi-
ties had been used to make gifts, to pay compensation, or to satisfy
obligations. The intention is that the disproportion will give rise
to income tax or gift tax liability where the circumstances so
warrant.
If in a Section 351 transaction too many bonds or notes are
issued in relation to the amount of stock issued, there will be a
question as to whether the corporation is not a "thin" corporation




Distribution of Stock and Securities of a Controlled
Corporation-Section 355
This section covers all divisive reorganizations, i.e., split-ups,
split-offs and spin-offs. It provided that if a corporation distributes
to a shareholder, with respect to its stock, or distributes to a secur-
ity holder, in exchange for its securities, solely stock or securities
of a corporation which it controls, no gain or loss will be recognized
to the distributees, subject to certain limitations as to "boot" dis-
tributions, provided the following requirements are met:
(1) The transaction must not be used principally as a device
for the distribution of earnings and profits of either the distribut-
ing or the controlled corporation;
(2) Certain requirements relating to active businesses must
be satisfied;
(3) As part of the distribution, the distributing corporation
must distribute:
(a) all of the stock and securities of the controlled cor-
poration held by it immediately before the distribution, or
(b) an amount of stock in the controlled corporation
constituting 80% control, and it must be established that any
retention of stock and securities did not have tax avoidance
as a principal purpose.
Distributions of the following items will be treated as distri-
butions of "other property" and will therefore be subject to possible
tax as "boot" under Section 356:
(1) Securities (as distinct from stock) of a controlled cor-
poration to the extent that the principal amount of such securities
distributed exceeds the principal amount of securities surrendered.
(2) Securities of a controlled corporation distributed where
no securities are surrendered.
(3) Other property distributed in addition to stock or securi-
ties of the controlled corporation.
(4) Distribution of stock of a controlled corporation which
was acquired by the distributing corporation by reason of any
transaction which occurred within five years prior to the distribu-
tion of such stock and in which gain or loss was recognized in whole
or in part.
This section is applicable whether or not the distribution is
pro rata with respect to all the shareholders of the distributing
corporation. An example of a non pro rata distribution would be a
divisive split-up, through the distribution of stock of two new con-
trolled corporations to which all the assets of the original corpora-
tion had been transferred, made, say, pursuant to anti-trust decree.Similarly, if two individuas, A and B, jointly form a corporatio
and later wish to operate independently through separate corpor-
ations, this may be accomplished hereunder provided the other
requirements of the section are met. This was not possible under
prior law.
This section applies whether or not the shareholder surrenders
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stock in the distributing corporation. Unlike the prior "spin-off"
provision, it also permits distribution of common and preferred
stock. However, where preferred stock is distributed, the rules of
Section 306 come into play.
This section applies even though the distribution is not in
pursuance of a plan of reorganization. This is also unlike the
"spin-off" provision of prior law. Because of the elimination of
the requirement that there be a reorganization, it is no longer
necessary for the distributing corporation to form a new corpora-
tion to effect the distribution; stock of an existing subsidiary may
be distributed.
While the new code does not refer to the need for a business
purpose in a spin-off transaction, the requirement that a transac-
tion not be used as a device for the distribution of earnings and
profits of the distributing corporation would, by inference, require
a showing of an adequate business purpose.
It is provided that the mere sale of stock received in a distri-
bution under Section 355 is not in and of itself to be treated as a
device for the distribution of earnings and profits, if the sale is
not part of a plan. This provision will benefit widely held corpor-
ations which cannot control the activities of their stockholders.
Receipt of Additional Consideration-Section 356
If Section 354 or 355 would apply to an exchange but for the
fact that the property received in the exchange consists not only
of stock of securities permitted by those sections to be received
without the recognition of gain but also of other property or money
("boot"), gain, if any, will be recognized to the recipient under
Section 356 but in an amount not in excess of the money and the
fair market value of other property received.
In any case where the receipt of "boot" has the effect of the
distribution of a dividend, there will be treated as a dividend to
each distributee such an amount of the gain recognized as is not
in excess of his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and
profits of the corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913.
The remainder, if any, of the gain recognized will be treated as a
gain from the exchange of property.
No loss will be recognized in a transaction falling within
Section 354 or 355 in which "boot" is received.
Basis to Corporations-Section 362
This section corresponds generally to Sections 113 (a) (7) and
113 (a) (8) of prior law and provides rules respecting the basis of
property acquired on or after June 22, 1954, by a corporation in
connection with a corporate organization (Section 351), as paid-in
surplus, as a contribution to capital, or in connection with a re-
organization.
It is provided that the basis of the property acquired will be
the same as it was in the hands of the transferor, increased in the
amount of gain recognized to the transferor on the transfer.
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The section also provides special rules with respect to contri-
butions to capital by nonstockholders in situations similar to those
which existed in Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner - and Detroit
Edison Co. v. Commissioner.° It is provided that:
(1) if property other than money is acquired by a corpor-
ation on or after June 22, 1954, as a contribution to capital and is
not contributed by a shareholder as such, the basis of the property
will be zero;
(2) if money is received by a corporation on or after June
22, 1954, as a contribution to capital and is not contributed by a
shareholder as such, the basis of any property acquired with such
money during the twelve-month period beginning on the day the
contribution is received will be reduced by the amount of such
contribution. The excess (if any) of the amount of such contribu-
tion over the amount of such reduction will be applied to the re-
duction, as of the last day of the twelve-month period above re-
ferred to, of the basis of any other property held by the taxpayer.
Rules for allocating reductions among properties will be covered
by regulations.
Definitions Relating to Corporate Reorganizations-Section 368
This section restates, with some modifications, the six differ-
ent ways in which a "reorganization" can be accomplished if it is
desired that the exchanges involved be tax-free. The familiar sym-
bols (A, B, C, D, E and F) of old Section 112(g) (1), by which
these six types were commonly known, are retained by the new
code. To summarize briefly, the six types as modified are:
(A) Statutory merger or consolidation.
(B) Acquisition of stock of another corporation solely for
voting stock provided the acquiring corporation then has
control (805%) of the acquired corporation.
(C) Acquisition of substantially all the properties of another
corporation solely for voting stock.
(D) Transfer of property to a controlled corporation fol-
lowed by distribution to shareholders of the stock or
securities of the corporation to which the property is
transferred.
(E) Recapitalization.
(F) Change in identity, form, or place or organization.
Types (A), (E) and (F) reorganizations are defined the same
as previously. Types (B), (C) and (D) are changed as follows:
(1) In the case of a type (B) reorganization, one corporation
can acquire solely for its own voting stock enough stock of another
to obtain control of the second corporation. Under prior law there
was doubt as to whether the statute permitted such an acquisition
tax-free when the acquiring corporation already owned some of
339 U. S. 583.
,319 U. S. 98.
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the voting stock of the other corporation. This doubt has now been
removed by the revised wording.
Example (1)
Corporation A bought for cash 20% of the stock of
Corporation B in 1940. In 1955 it acquires an additional
60 % of the stock of Corporation B in exchange for its vot-
ing stock. This 1955 exchange is tax-free since A controls
B immediately after the exchange. In addition, any subse-
quent acquisition of B stock by A in exchange for voting
stock of A would be tax-free.
(2) A type (C) reorganization permits the acquisition by
one corporation, without the recognition of gain or loss, of sub-
stantially all of the properties of another corporation in exchange
for part or all of the voting stock of the acquiring corporation.
The definition has been changed from prior law in order to modify
the rule laid down by the Groman and Bashford decisions. 1 Under
the (C) definition, as modified, a corporation may acquire sub-
stantially all the properties of another corporation solely in ex-
change for the voting stock of a corporation which is in control of
the acquiring corporation.
Example (2)
Corporation P owns all the stock of Corporation S.
All the assets of Corporation W are transferred to Cor-
poration S solely in exchange for the voting stock of Cor-
poration P. This now constitutes a (C) type reorganiza-
tion. Previously, it did not and was a taxable transaction.
(3) A type (D) reorganization permits a transfer, without
recognition of gain or loss, by a corporation of all or part of its
assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the
transferor corporation, or its shareholders, or both, are in control
of the transferee. This definition has been changed so that now, if
the control of the transferee corporation is in the transferor or in
persons who were shareholders of the transferor, or any combina-
tion of them, the transfer will qualify as a (D) type reorganization,
even if the control owned by these persons is not in the same pro-
portions as it was before the transfer.
This section also contains certain special rules which modify
the definition of a reorganization as compared with prior law.
Among these rules is the following:
Where one corporation acquires substantially all the property
of another in a (C) type reorganization, if at least 80 per cent of
the fair market value of all the property of the other corporation
is acquired solely for voting stock, the remainder of the property
may be acquired for cash or other property without disqualifying




the transaction as a reorganization. For this purpose only, a lia-
bility assumed or to which the property is subject is considered
other property given in the acquisition.
Example (3)
Corporation A has assets worth $100,000 and $10,000
in liabilities. Corporation Y acquired $98,000 worth of
the assets subject to the liabilities of $10,000. In exchange
for these assets, Corporation Y issues voting stock, as-
sumes the $10,000 of liabilities, and pays $8,000 in cash.
This transaction is a (C) type reorganization even though
a part of the assets of Corporation A is acquired for cash.
This is because the liabilities and the cash together do not
exceed 20 per cent of the value of the assets of the ac-
quired corporation. On the other hand, if the assets of
Corporation A, worth $100,000, were subject to $50,000 in
liabilities, an acquisition of all the assets subject to the
liabilities could only be in exchange for voting stock be-
cause the liabilities alone are in excess of 20 per cent of
the fair market value of the property.
Therefore, while the (C) definition has been modified to per-
mit a certain amount of cash to pass as well as voting stock, the
amount of cash is limited by the liabilities which are taken over in
the transaction.
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ESTATE, TRUST, AND DECEDENT INCOME
By STANLEY L. DREXLER of the Denver Bar
Many taxpayers, for some reason, are reluctant to share their
wealth, even with their families. Many taxpayers, for the same
reason, are eager to divide their surtax brackets, especially with
their families. Trusts often permit the division of surtax brackets
to a greater degree than they require the sharing of wealth. Trusts
are, therefore, popular with many taxpayers.
That part of the subject assigned to me which deals with the
taxation of the income of trusts under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 has the familiar flavor of the historic battle of ingenuity
between taxpayer's counsel in devising, and the government in
frustrating, plans for the simultaneous eating and having of cake.
Although the tax consequences are favorable, dying evidently
is believed to involve other consequences too extreme and final ever
to become a popular means of avoiding income taxes, and, in the
sections of the 1954 code applicable to the taxation of a decedent's
post-mortem income and the income of his estate, the sovereign
presents a more benign countenance, indulging the presumption
that the death of the citizen stemmed from non-tax considerations.
The sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 dealing with
these two aspects of taxes and death are collected in Subchapter
J of Chapter I of Subtitle A and are headed "Estate, Trusts, Bene-
ficiaries, and Decedents."
Subchapter J is one of the eighteen subchapters of Chapter I,
which is devoted to "Normal Taxes and Surtaxes." Together with
five other chapters, it comprises Subtitle A, "Income Taxes," one
of the six subtitles of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Subchapter J is divided into two parts:
Part I-Estates, Trusts and Beneficiaries
Part II-Income in Respect of Decedents
Part I is divided into six subparts:
Subpart A-General Rules for the Taxation of Trusts and
Estates
Subpart B-Trusts Which Distribute Current Income
Only
Subpart C-Estates and Trusts Which May Accumulate
Income on Which Distribute Corpus
Subpart D-Treatment of Excess Distributions of Trusts
Subpart E-Grantors and Others Treated as Substantial
Owners
Subpart F-Miscellaneous
Having created six subparts and found them good, Congress
rested and did no work on the seventh. Part II contains only two
sections and is not divided into subparts.
The number of the first section of each subpart of Part I and
of the first section of Part II, like the first number on each block
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along Fifth Avenue in New York, begins a new series of ten,
whether or not the previous subpart contains ten sections. Thus,
although there are twenty-five sections in Subchapter J, the num-
bers run from 641 to 692.
Part I covers roughly the same ground as Supplement E,
"Estates and Trusts," of the 1939 code, Sections 161 to 172. How-
ever, Section 165 of the 1939 code, "Employees Trusts," has been
moved over to Subchapter D of the 1954 code, "Deferred Compen-
sation, Etc.," and Section 169 of the 1939 code, "Common Trust
Funds," is part of Subchapter H, "Banking Institutions," and
are not covered here.
The remaining sections of Supplement E emerge as Part I
after being thickly diluted with the draft prepared by the Ameri-
can Law Institute and greatly expanded by lifting the Clifford
regulations to the statutory level.
Part II is derived from Sections 126 and 154 of the 1939 code.
The latter, which deals with the income taxes of the Armed Forces
on death, will not be dealt with in this article.
Trusts which constitute associations taxable as corporations
are not mentioned in Subchapter J, nor were they in Supplement E.
The controlling law is found in the decisions of the courts con-
struing the definition of a corporation carried from the 1939 to
the 1954 code without change as part of a general definitions section.
The basic concepts of the taxation of trusts and estates have
been preserved and, in fact, strengthened by the 1954 code, but
there have been major changes of organization, form, and mach-
inery and several important changes of substance.
I
The first principle of the law pertaining to the taxation of
estate and trust income is the dual nature of a trust or estate for
tax purposes. Just as a partnership is for some purposes treated
as an aggregate and for some purposes as an entity, a trust or
an estate (which, after all, is not more than a particular kind of
trust, arising by operation of law) is for some purposes a separate
tax-paying entity and for other purposes a mere conduit for the
distribution of income and principal, or both, to its beneficiaries.
Almost all of the complications of the law pertaining to this branch
of my subject consist of little chips which come loose from the
rough edges of these two concepts when they are squeezed together
into an artificial union.
In the capacity of a trust as a separate tax-paying entity
there are no very revolutionary differences between it and an
individual taxpayer. Both are subject to taxation at the same
rates, although a trust is expressly denied the optional standard
deduction and is incapable of enjoying the tax advantages of
matrimony.
An estate has a personal exemption of $600, as under prior
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law. The 1954 code makes a new distinction, which I will discuss
later, between trusts which are required to distribute all of their
income currently, on the one hand, and estates and trusts which
may accumulate income or which distribute corpus, on the other.
Although the code does not use the terms "simple" and "complex,"
all of the explanations I have seen refer to the former as simple
and the latter as complex. Simple trusts are given a personal
exemption of $300, an increase of $200 over the former exemption
allowed to all trusts. This is to soak up small amounts of capital
gain or stock dividends which constitute additions to corpus under
local law or the trust instrument, but which are income for tax
purposes. Complex trusts retain the $100 exemption.
The moral of this chapter is pretty plain. Not so much because
of the separate personal exemptions, but because tax brackets
start again at the bottom for each separate taxpayer, use as many
separate trusts as possible. If a single instrument is used to create
trusts for several beneficiaries each having a fixed share of the
corpus, whether one or several trusts will result for tax purposes
will depend upon the intention of the grantor as evidenced by the
language used. Therefore, either use language so plain as not to
be open to debate or use separate instruments. A trustee may be
authorized to consolidate the accounting and investment treatment
of several separate trusts without thereby sacrificing their separ-
ate identity for tax purposes.
As I have said, a trust in its capacity as a separate tax-paying
entity is treated for most tax purposes the same as an individual.
Its income is not only taxed at the same rates but also determined
and computed in the same manner. With two important exceptions,
it has the same deductions as an individual. The first of those excep-
tions is that a trust has an unlimited deduction for amounts of
gross income paid, permanently set aside or used for charitable
purposes during the taxable year. This is not so very remarkable,
considering that the grantor could have set up a charitable trust
in the first place. To this exception there is the exception that, if
the trust is caught finagling with the grantor in what the code
calls prohibited transactions or is guilty of unreasonable accumu-
lations of amounts set aside for charitable purposes or devotes the
contributions to earning unrelated business income, like New York
University's spaghetti factory, then the unlimited charitable con-
tribution is lost and the trust, if guilty of prohibited transactions
or unreasonable accumulations, has the same charitable contribu-
tion deduction limit as an individual under the 1954 code. A trust
gets no deduction for contributions allocable to the production of
unrelated business income but is allowed the same deductions as an
individual in computing that income. A contribution by a trust to
the Mueller Spaghetti Company, for example, would be non-deduct-
ible, but the Spaghetti Company could deduct its contributions to
New York University.
The other distinctive deduction of a trust is the deduction for
DICTA
March, 1955
distributions to its beneficiaries given to effect the bifurcation of
its function between the accumulation and distribution of its in-
come. I shall defer discussion of that deduction until the trust as
a conduit for the distribution of income has been covered.
To the extent that the income of a trust is currently distri-
butable to its beneficiaries, the trust is treated principally as a con-
duit, and the tax consequences are generally the same as if the
trust had not been set up and the income distributed to the bene-
ficiaries had been taxed directly to them in the first place without
the intervention of any trust. Of course if the trust and the bene-
ficiary have different taxable years, there has to be a rule to per-
mit each to cast up its accounts on the annual basis, and that rule,
as you would expect, is that the beneficiary has to include in his
taxable income the taxable income passing to him through the con-
duit of a trust having a taxable year ending before or simultan-
eously with the close of his own taxable year.
There is no special trust problem in determining when income
is earned, but the ingenuity of taxpayers in figuring out ways of
sitting on the fence until it was certain which way it would save
the most taxes to jump, has led to the development of some special
rules as to when income is considered as distributed. First, as to
trusts which are required by the terms of the trust instrument or
by local law to distribute all of their income currently, the law has
always been and still is that the entire taxable income of a taxable
year is treated as having been distributed within the taxable year
whether or not it is actually distributed. As to trusts in which it
lies within the discretion of the trustee whether income is to be
currently distributed or accumulated, the old rule was that income
which was properly paid or credited to the beneficiaries within
the tax year was treated on the conduit principle and the remain-
ing income on the separate tax paying entity principle. Taxpayers
developed the wait-and-see habit to such an extent that the tax-
able year was artificially extended sixty-five days for the purpose
of deciding what distributions were to be considered as having
been made to the beneficiaries. The 1954 code, as we shall con-
sider, has developed what was supposed to be much heavier artil-
lery than the sixty-five-day rule to use against taxpayers who would
exploit lower brackets available to trusts for the current taxation
of incomes to be later distributed tax-free to high-bracket bene-
ficiaries, and has no need for the sixty-five-day rule. Accordingly,
it has been abrogated, but to avoid retroactive repeal, it will still
apply to the first sixty-five days following the close of a trust's
first tax year falling under the new law, that is, a year beginning
in 1954 or later and ending after August 16, 1954. A proposed
regulation would allow an election to continue on the sixty-five-day
rule.
We have now developed our broad pattern far enough to see
that trusts are separate tax-paying entities with respect to the in-
come which they accumulate and are conduits to the extent of their
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currently distributable income and that all income which is re-
quired to be distributed within the taxable year is treated as a cur-
rent distribution taxable to the beneficiary.
A corollary of these rules is the principle that there is one
group of credits and deductions allowable to the trust by virtue
of its status as a taxpayer and which it may take even though it
distributes all of its income, and another group, such as deprecia-
tion, for example, which attach to particular sources of income and
have to be allocated between trust and beneficiary depending upon
whether, as to that particular income, the trust is treated as a
taxpayer or as a conduit.
The trust may take its personal exemption, the net-operating
loss carry-over deduction, and the unlimited deduction for charit-
able contribution, without regard to how it accumulates or dis-
tributes its income. Credits for partially tax exempt interest,
foreign taxes, and the new dividends-received credit available to
individuals are allowed to the trust only to the extent that they
are not properly allocable to the beneficiary. Depreciation, deple-
tion, and amortization have to be allocated between the trust and
the beneficiary. The only one of these allocations which promises
to be troublesome is the allocation of the new $50 exclusion feature
of the dividends-received credit. This exclusion is in the nature of
an exemption and thus would seem allowable to any taxpayer who
enjoys $50 or more of dividend income. The way the law works,
however, it looks as if a trust which has $100 worth of dividend
income, of which it accumulates $50 and distributes $50 will wind
up paying tax on $50, even though it would seem that the trust in
its taxpayer role is entitled to accumulate $50 worth of dividend
income tax-free and deduct the other $50 which it currently dis-
tributes. It may be that the regulations will straighten this out,
although for reasons which will become apparent as we go along,
this would be inconsistent with the mechanism established for
gearing the income of the trust with the distributions to the bene-
ficiaries.
Before leaving the subject of the deductions and credits avail-
able to the trust and the beneficiaries, it is appropriate to mention
that the 1954 code permits the beneficiaries succeeding to the trust's
property upon termination of the trust to avail themselves of any
unused portion of a carry-over of a net operating loss or capital
loss and any deductions except for personal exemption and chari-
table contributions in excess of the gross income of the trust or es-
tate for its final year. Under former law the courts refused to allow
such substitution on the ground that the trust and its beneficiaries
were different taxpayers.
Our pattern now shapes up like this: To the extent of its
current income accumulations, a trust is a separte taxpayer with
the usual deductions and credit. To the extent of current income
required to be distributed, a trust is a conduit, transmitting in-
come and those special credits and deductions attributable to the
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income transmitted. Unused deductions are transmitted to the
beneficiaries upon termination of the trust.
Another corollary of these principles implicit in what I have
already said is that income passing through the conduit is un-
changed in character in the hands of the beneficiaries. Capital
gains remain capital gains; exempt interest is not made taxable
by passing through a trust, and so on.
II
The next principle which I will discuss is that income of a
trust or estate transmitted to beneficiaries whether currently or
ultimately is generally subject to only one tax. If it is taxed to the
trust because it is accumulated, it is then set up for tax-free dis-
tribution to the beneficiary upon termination of the trust. If it
passes through the conduit of the trust as currently distributable
income, it is taxable to the beneficiary and not to the trust. Con-
gress, however, has fouled up the beautiful symmetry and sim-
plicity of this pattern by a rather complicated throwback rule de-
signed to frustrate well-laid plans to distribute lightly-taxed trust
accumulations to high-bracket beneficiaries free of a second tax
bite. As I shall show, his throwback rule may throwbackfire on the
Treasury.
I can't hope to explain the throwback rule without first dis-
cussing the mechanism which the 1954 code employs for gearing
the deduction allowed to the trust for distributions to its bene-
ficiaries with the income that is taxable to the beneficiaries and
showing how it operates, year by year, both in the case of what
everybody except Congress calls simple trusts and in the case of
what everybody but Congress terms complex trusts.
The need for such a mechanism grew out of cases like Johns-
ton v. Helvering 1 and McCullough v. Commissioner,2 which pointed
up the ineptness of the 1939 code in finding a technique of treat-
ing the trust as a conduit. The 1939 code sought to accomplish
this by simply allowing to the trust a deduction for net income
currently distributable or distributed to beneficiaries. In Johnston
v. Helvering, this resulted in the beneficiary's paying a tax on the
proceeds of a mortgage salvage operation regarded as income by
local law in a year where the trust suffered a loss, and in McCul-
lough v. Commissioner, a non-taxable stock dividend was taxed to
the beneficiary because the trust instrument decreed its distribu-
tion as income. The 1954 code prevents the occurrence of this kind
of thing by a mechanism analogous to that employed in the area
of rptermining the tyable nature of corporate distributions, that
is, by first setting up a yardstick of taxable distributions. In the
dividend field, the mechanism is the concept of accumulated earn-
'Johnston v. Helvering, 141 F. (2d) 208 (2nd Cir. 1944), cert. den. 323 U. S.
715.
2 McCullough v. Commissioner, 153 F. (2d) 345 (2nd Cir. 1946).
DICTA
March, 1955
ings and profits. In the trust field, the mechanism is the concept of
distributable net income.
Distributable net income is obtained, by doing a number of
esoteric things to taxable income. Once obtained, it serves as a
measure and a ceiling both of the deduction allowed to the trust
for distributions and the income taxable to the beneficiaries by
reason of those distributions. Since taxable income of the trust
is the starting point in the computation of distributable net income
and since all of the deductions of trust have already been taken out
and only the personal exemption is added back (this I can under-
stand), the result is that the beneficiaries participate in the
trust's deductions even though the trust distributes all of its
income. Under the 1939 code the trust's deduction for trustee's
commissions would be lost if the trust distributed all of its income.
Under the scheme of the 1954 code, this deduction goes to reduce
the trust's income and thus reduces the amount upon which the
beneficiaries are taxable. The operation of this mechanism differs
somewhat in simple and complex trusts, and, although I have been
tossing those terms around, I have not yet defined them.
A simple trust is one in which all of the current income, and
only the current income, is directed to be currently distributed.
This does not mean that a simple trust cannot, by definition, ac-
cumulate taxable income. The simple trust is permitted, either by
the express terms or the necessary implications of the code pro-
visions, to exclude from what is to be currently distributed to the
beneficiaries such items as capital gains, stock dividends, and ex-
traordinary dividends, and to provide for depreciation at a faster
rate than that allowable for tax purposes. All that is apparently
required for qualification as a simple trust is that all of the income,
as that term is used in the trust instrument and under applicable
local law, be currently distributable and that the trustee act in
good faith under the instrument and local law in making alloca-
tions to corpus of items which are income for tax purposes. Thus,
a simple trust with a built-in $300 per year accumulation feature
would be an easy way to accumulate a nest egg tax-free for each
of a high bracket taxpayer's numerous grandchildren. The fact
that the trust also provides for corpus distribution does not dis-
qualify it as a simple trust for years in which no such distribution
is made nor does it lose the trust the $300 exemption even in such
a year. However, since the code requires that a simple trust dis-
tribute current income only, the simplified treatment is not avail-
able in a year, such as, for example, the year of termination, in
which there is corpus distribution. A simple trust may be inter-
vivos or testamentary, but an estate in administration is expressly
disqualified for treatment as a simple trust.
By elimination, estates and all other trusts are treated as
complex trusts. The first big additional problem which we face
when we come to estates and complex trusts is that we are fre-
quently dealing with the distribution of corpus as well as of income,
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sometimes to the same and sometimes to different sets of bene-
ficiaries. Gifts and bequests of property, as distinguished from
gifts and bequests of income, are received tax-free by the bene-
ficiaries.
Any amount properly paid or credited under the terms of the
will or trust as a bequest or gift of a specific sum of money or
specific property, either all at once or in not more than three in-
stallments, is treated as bequest or gift of property for this pur-
pose. A gift or bequest which can be paid only out of income is
not excluded. An annuity which is to be paid out of income, if
possible, and out of corpus, if necessary, is treated as a current
income distribution to the extent actually satisfied out of current
income.
The deduction of the complex trust or estate for distributions
to its beneficiaries is the sum of the amounts required to be cur-
rently distributed plus any portion of an annuity payable out of
income or corpus which is actually paid out of current income, and
all other amounts properly paid, credited, or required to be distri-
buted during the taxable year, whether income or corpus, up to
the ceiling of distributable net income.
Here the analogy to accumulated earnings and profits again
becomes apt. I like to think of earnings and profits as a liquid of
heavier specific gravity which sinks to the bottom of a vessel where
there is a spigot that is turned on when corporate distributions are
drawn off. As long as there are corporate earnings and profits
there is no way, short of cracking open the vessel at the top by a
partial liquidation or breaking it up by complete liquidation, of
drawing off distributions from any other source.
So it is with a complex trust having some beneficiaries to whom
current income distributions are required to be made and some
beneficiaries who receive distributions which may be from non-
current sources, whether income accumulated from past years or
corpus. The members of the second class are the first-class citizens
tax-wise, and the first class is distinctly second class tax-wise. To
the extent of the available net distributable income the first group
must include in their gross income all distributions required to be
made to them. They have no way of drawing off the liquid from
the tax-free top. The others (who may or may not be the same
persons), the elite group, need include in their gross income only
their share of the distributable net income remaining after the
untouchables have soaked up the nasty, dirty taxable liquid. Fur-
thermore, the elite class may deduct specifically non-taxable gifts
and bequests paid out of eornu.
There is, however, left even to the untouchables the protection
of the so-called character rule that income retains in the hands of
the beneficiaries its character as capital gain, partially exempt, or
wholly exempt income and the specific provisions allocating to
particular classes of income particular kinds of deductions ap-
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plicable therein, such as depreciation. In the absence of a direction
by the grantor or testator, beneficiaries participate ratably in all
classes of trust income and would share the benefit of the character
rule and the allocation provisions in the same ratable manner.
III
In the cases with which we have been dealing so far, we have
generally assumed that distributable net income was less than the
amount distributed. What happens when the trust distributes
more income than its current income out of income which it has
accumulated in the past? Going back to our pattern, if this income
has already been subject to taxation in the hands of the trust, it
should not again be taxed when distributed to the beneficiary. But
the 1954 code may spoil that pattern by requiring a throwback. A
throwback has no connection with a fullback, but it is a kind of
reverse forward pass. Before there can be a throwback there must
be what the code calls an accumulation distribution, that is, a dis-
tribution in excess of distributable net income for that year. Even
though there is an accumulation distribution, there is no throwback
unless some other tests are met. First there are knocked out of
the excess of distribution over distributable net income (1) any
distributions accumulated before the birth of the beneficiary or
before his attaining the age of 21, (2) distributions made to meet
the beneficiary's emergency needs, (3) distributions not more than
four in number spaced not more closely than four years between
any two and required by a trust instrument in existence on Janu-
ary 1, 1954, upon a beneficiary's attaining specified ages, and
(4) a final distribution of a trust made more than nine years
after the last transfer to the trust. If the excess distributions
exceed these four items by more than $2,000, there is an accumu-
lation distribution as to the entire excess. If the excess distribu-
tions do not exceed the sum of these four items plus $2,000, there
is no accumulation distribution and there can be no throwback.
If there is an accumulation distribution, then it is carried
back, a year at a time, and applied against undistributed net in-
come, that is, the deficiency of distributions compared with the
sum of taxes of the trust and its distributable net income. The
unabsorbed portion of the accumulation distribution, if any, is
carried back again to the next preceding year, and this process is
continued until the entire accumulation distribution is absorbed or
until five years have been searched.
The amount reallocated to any year by this process is treated
as a constructive distribution by the trust for that year. The bene-
ficiaries do not, however, file amended returns for that year, nor
does the trust receive a refund or credit of its taxes paid in the
year of reallocation. Instead, the beneficiaries include in their
income for the current year their share of the constructive distri-
bution for the year of reallocation. In amount and character the
constructive distributions are included in the beneficiaries' cur-
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rent income only as they would have been includable had they
actually been made in the year of constructive distribution. Thus,
if the income of the trust in the year to which the throwback per-
tains was 50 per cent non-taxable, the income included in the year
in which the throwback originates is likewise 50 per cent non-
taxable. The taxes of a particular beneficiary resulting from a
throwback cannot exceed the taxes which he would have paid had
the income constructively distributed been actually distributed to
him in the years to which the throwback applies. Thus additional
taxes are includable at the lower of (1) the effective tax rates on
the current year, or (2) the aggregate of the former years.
The trust's taxes for the former year or years, instead of be-
ing refunded or credited to the trust, are credited to the extent
of the overpayment resulting from the reallocation pro rata among
the beneficiaries who bear the burden of the reallocation. These
credits may be used in payment of the beneficiary's tax liabilities
for the year in which the throwback originates, not only against
the additional taxes resulting from the throwback, but against any
other tax liability of the beneficiary for that year. I foresee still
more social security for accountants in making the necessary com-
putations. I also forsee some pretty bizarre possibilities. I shall
use the illustration appearing at pages 1621 to 1622 of the 1954
Revenue Act Coordinator prepared by the Research Institute of
America.
The trust and the beneficiaries report on the cash and calen-
dar year basis. The trust derives all of its income from taxable in-
terest. For 1955, 1956 and 1957 its net income was $30,000, $10,000
and $20,000 respectively. The trustee must distribute one-half of
the income currently to A, and in his discretion may pay out of
income or corpus (not for emergency or other excepted purpose)
to B or C, or both, amounts totalling not more than $15,000 in
any one year.
A received $15,000, $5,000 and $10,000 in 1955, 1956, and 1957,
respectively. B received nothing in 1955, $5,000 in 1956, and $9,000
in 1957. C received nothing in 1955 or 1956, and $6,000 in 1957.
Since A is not affected, the illustration deals only with B and C
who are single and without dependents. In 1957, neither has in-
come except from the trust. In 1955, B has outside taxable income
of $5,000; C has none. The 1954 tax rates are assumed to continue.
In 1957 the trust has a distributable net income of $20,000.
After the mandatory distribution of $10,000 to A, there is $10,000
left. B and C receive a total of $15,000, so there is an accumulation
distributution of $5,000. This is first thrown back to 1956, but
there is not undistributed net income. in 1955, however, the trust
had $10,317 of undistributed income after its distribution to A and
its tax of $4,683. Reallocation results in constructive distributions
of $4,362 to B and $2,908 to C. B's tax, if the constructive distri-
bution had been made in 1955, is lower than the increase resulting
from adding it to 1957, and so he pays the lower figure, which is
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$1,090, plus his 1957 tax on his other income of $1,048, or a total of
$2,138. C is also better off with a 1955 constructive distribution of
$404 as against a $640 1957 increase. C's tax for 1957 on his regu-
lar income not attributable to the throwback is $620. The total
with the tax computed on a 1955 basis is $1,024 for C. The trust's
tax overpayment of $2,834 is allocated 9/15 ($1,700) to B and 6/15
($1,134) to C. B's tax for 1957 after the credit is $438, or $610
less than it would have been had he not been the victim of the
throwback, and C, who would have paid $620 in 1957 but for the
throwback, pays nothing. If C had received a distribution of only
$4,000 in 1957, he still would have had a tax of $620 to pay. How-
ever, since he actually received $6,000, he has no tax to pay.
Before I leave this phase of my subject, I would like to try to
complete the broad pattern which I started.
Trusts (and estates, which are a special kind of trust) are
separate taxpayers. They are also conduits for the distribution of
income. To the extent that they are not mere conflicts, they are
taxable at the same rates as individuals, their income is determined
in the same manner, and they have largely the same ldnd of credits
and deductions. They have a special unlimited charitable deduction
which may be lost by prohibited transactions, unreasonable accum-
ulations, or unrelated business income. The extent to which trusts
serve as mere conduits is determined by a special kind of deduction
for their distributions to their beneficiaries. While technically all
income is taxable to the trust and distributions deductible by the
trust, the trust's distributive deduction and the beneficiary's tax-
able distribution are so geared together as to strengthen the conduit
principle. This is accomplished by a concept of distributable net
income which serves as a measure of both. It consists of the trust's
taxable income with certain adjustments. It accordingly precludes
taxation to the beneficiaries of items which are not part of the
trust's taxable income. Certain deductions and credits peculiar to
certain classes of income are allocated between trust and benefi-
ciary as that income is distributed or accumulated. Others are
available to the trust in any event. Unused deductions and credits
are transferred to the beneficiaries on the termination of the trust.
The new code provides that income of the trust retains its charac-
ter in the hands of the beneficiaries. Trusts which are required to
distribute currently all of their income and which distribute only
income, commonly known as simple trusts, are given a simpler
treatment in the code than estates and other trusts. Such trusts
have a personal exemption of $300. Other trusts have a $100 per-
sonal exemption. Estates have a $600 exemption. A simple trust
retains its exemption even in a year of corpus distributions. In
estates and complex trusts, distributable net income is first attri-
buted to income beneficiaries who are entitled to receive current
income distributions and then the remainder to other beneficiaries.
Gifts and bequests of specific property are transmitted by the trust
tax-free to the beneficiaries. In the absence of specific direction
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in the trust instrument, a ratable portion of all classes of income
are distributed to all beneficiaries. A new five-year throwback rule
designed to recoup taxes saved through accumulation by trusts at
low tax rates and distributing to the beneficiary in his low tax
years is a feature of the code, and it may backfire or produce
strange results in some cases.
IV
Subpart E of Subsection J deals with the taxation of the in-
come of trusts to the grantor or some other person as substantial
owner.
In a series of decisions in 1940, the United States Supreme
Court greatly extended the sweep of Section 22(a) of the 1939
internal revenue code defining gross income in broad terms of
gains, profits and income from any source whatever. These decisions
included Helvering v. Clifford,3 taxing to the grantor the income
of a trust for a five-year term, with a reversion to the grantor, and
the grantor aa trustee having the power to distribute or accumulate
income in his discretion and broad powers of management. The
beneficiary was the wife of the grantor. They also included Helver-
ing v. Horst 4 and Helvering v. Eubank,5 taxing to the assignor
income to which he had a fixed right and which he attmepted to
assign to another. These cases were foreshadowed by Lucas v.
Earl.6
The Clifford case spawned what I believe may well constitute
the largest body of decisions on any point of tax law and which is
very respectable by comparison with the volume of cases on any
other narrow point of law, tax or non-tax. Erudite articles have
been written as to whether any of the factors of the Clifford case
standing alone-shortness of term, grantor as trustee with power
to determine whether income should be distributed or accumulated,
breadth of administrative powers of the trustee, relationship of
husband and wife between grantor and beneficiary-would be
enough to invoke the doctrine of the case, and whether or not the
approach was in terms of examining broadly the whole bundle of
rights.
Late in 1945 the Treasury issued, and in 1947 substantially
modified, the so-called Clifford regulations which attempted to in-
troduce some order and definiteness into what had become an ex-
tremely complicated situation. Most of the cases had emphasized
the necessity of examining each case in the light of all of the sur-
rounding facts, with no one factor being controlling. The regu-
lations specified numerous factors, any one of which caused the
income of the trust to be taxable to the grantor. The regulations
'309 U. S. 331 (1940).
S331 U. S. 112 (1940).
'331 U. S. 122 (1940).
-281 U. S. 111 (1930).
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provided, for example, that the fact that the trust was for a shorter
period than ten years was standing alone enough to condemn the
trust. These regulations received mixed treatment by the courts,
and they did, almost admittedly, represent legislation by regula-
tion. The most significant thing about the treatment of the Clifford
principle in the 1954 code is the very fact that the regulations are
now law, rather than any of the relatively, minor modifications of
the regulations.
The ten year minimum term has been adopted. In the regu-
lations a term between ten and fifteen years was also suspect, pro-
vided other factors of control were present. This has been dropped.
The code introduces a new two-year charitable trust. Although the
grantor's revisionary interest in such a short term trust is probably
too great to permit a charitable contribution deduction for the value
of the property contributed, many taxpayers may be interested
in such an arrangement, which permits the devotion of particular
property to charitable use and gets the income clear out of the
grantor's returns for that period at the price a very short-term
commitment.
The regulations and the code treat the grantor as the continued
owner where he reserves the power to control beneficial enjoyment
by shuffling the income among beneficiaries of his choice. The code
makes this power more restrictive by reserving such spray pro-
visions to an independent trustee rather than a close relative,
whether or not there is a resonably definite external standard.
Under the regulations a spouse was barred from exercising such
a spray power. The code in one breath relaxes this rule by allow-
ing a spouse to serve if not subservient to the wishes of the grantor
and then tightens it up by presuming the spouse to be subservient
and requiring proof by the preponderance of the evidence in the
case of the non-subservient spouse.
The power of the grantor to borrow from the trust without
adequate interest or security has been made less sure-death by a
provision that this is all right, if the trustee, provided he is not
the grantor, has a similar power with respect to any person. As a
trustee the grantor is permitted to hold and vote stock owned by
the trust and direct the investment of trust funds. As grantor in
a non-fiduciary capacity, he may do so only if the holdings of the
trust and his own holdings are not significant from the standpoint
of voting control.
In addition to the situations covered by the Clifford regula-
tions, the grantor is taxable on the trust income in the situations,
with a few minor modifications, covered by sections 166 and 167
of the 1939 code.
A power to revoke thus continues to cause the trust income
to be taxable to the grantor. The new code provides that if such
power will not arise for ten years the trust is recognized until then
but becomes invalid then unless the power is renounced.
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Income which may be distributed to the grantor, held or ac-
cumulated for the benefit of the grantor, or used to pay premiums
on an insurance policy on his life continues to be taxable to the
grantor, as under present law. There is no reason to think that the
line of decisions restricting the sweep of the provisions with regard
to insurance premiums to premiums on policies actually in force
during the taxable year does not apply to the new language, which
is substantially the same as the old. In view of the estate tax pro-
visions abrogating the premium payment test with respect to the
includability of proceeds of policies owned by some one else on the
life of insured, it may be questioned whether or not the continua-
tion of this income tax provision is consistent with the philosophy
expressed in the new code.
Income from trusts for the support of dependents of the
grantor continues to be taxable to the grantor to the extent that
current income is actually so applied.
A beneficiary or other person than the grantor having the
power to vest the corpus or income of a trust in himself is taxed
as substantial owner unless he renounces the power within a reason-
able time after learning of its existence and unless the grantor is
taxable on the income. Although the 1954 code contains no pro-
visions dealing with the reciprocal trust situation or the case of a
nominal grantor, there is no reason to believe that the authority of
existing court decisions has been weakened.
The income of alimony trusts continues to be taxable to the
divorced wife as under present law, and she need be only separ-
ated under a written separation agreement rather than divorced
or legally separated, as under present law. This conforms the law
of alimony trusts to the changes made in the deductions and taxable
income sections of the new code, assimilating the tax status of
payments made under a written separation agreement to payments
made under a decree of divorce or separte maintenance.
Prior to the enactment of the revenue act of 1942, income of
a decedent was accrued in his final return. This led to a bunching
of income. The 1942 act corrected this inequitable situation by
permitting the estate or beneficiary to receive the income to which
the decedent was entitled with the same tax consequences as would
have ensued had the decedent lived to receive it. The 1954 code
extends this treatment one step further. Under the former law the
income entitled to be received derivatively by the beneficiary would
be bunched in the beneficiary's final return in the event of the bene-
ficiary's death. The '54 code corrects this situation and avoids a
bhing of income taxes in the final return of.a.. .wio who was
receiving, for example, royalties from a book written by her de-
ceased husband. These would now be taxed to the children as re-
ceived, and presumably to the grandchildren on the death of the
children.
Under the 1939 code the death of the obligee of installment
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obligations precipitated the tax due on the value of the obligations
unless a bond was filed conditioned upon the payment of taxes on
the installment payments. This requirement is eliminated under
the '54 code. The excess of the face value of the obligations over
basis to the decendent is treated as an income item transmitted on
death and is taxable to the estate or beneficiary when realized.
Under prior law the estate or beneficiary of a decedent could
deduct for income tax purposes a proportionate part of the estate
tax only if the income right originated with the decedent. This
role has been changed to conform with the possibility of successive
transmissions. The deduction of estate tax for income tax purposes
formerly belonged to the estate. It now belongs to the beneficiary
if the income right upon which the deduction is based has been dis-
tributed or is distributable to the beneficiary.
The deductible estate tax depends upon the aggregate value of
all postmortem rights. A surviving annuitant under a joint and
survivor annuity is expressly granted this deduction of estate tax
paid on the transmitted income right. The value of the right for
estate tax purposes is computed by determining the excess of the
value of the annuity at the date of death over the amount excludible
from the survivor's gross income during his life expectancy and
multiplying this by the ratio of the estate tax and date of death
valuations of the annuity. Since the decedent may have paid part
of the cost, these figures may differ.
Most of the changes we have discussed are in the direction of
better draftsmanship and organization and represent, for the most
part, desirable changes substantively. There are, however, com-
plications remaining in the new code, particularly as to the new
provisions regarding complex trusts and estates and the throwback.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, although it is an enormously
impressive task and represents an infinite improvement over the
1939 code in the field we have been considering, looks as if it still
will require some further overhauling in the light of operating
experience.
Your contribution to the Colorado Bar Foundation today
will still be promoting a better administration of justice in
Colorado for generations to come. The corpus of funds which
the Foundation acquires cannot be invaded. Name the Colo-
rado Bar Foundation in your Will. Mail your contribution




INCOME AND EXCLUSIONS FROM INCOME
CLYDE N. RANDALL of the Utah Bar; C.P.A., Utaht
The subject assigned to me, "Income and Exclusions from
Income," was outlined to include roughly those sections in the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 from 61 to 120, except those dealing
with insurance, annuities, and capital contributions to corporations,
which materially changed the former law as it existed in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 as amended.
GROSS INCOME
At the outset, probably only a few words on the general con-
cept of income will be sufficient, leaving our major concern to
those exclusions from gross income provided by the new statute.
First, the concept of gross income, the beginning point in the
determination of tax liability, is defined in Section 61 of the new
code. While the language is somewhat similar to Section 22 (a) of
the old code, it is rearranged. The new Code Section 61 states,
"Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means
all income, from whatever source derived, including (but not lim-
ited to) the following items." Notice the language, "income from
whatever source derived" used in the new code has been lifted
verbatim from the Sixteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion. This was not the case with Section 22 (a) of the old code.
It would appear that whatever controversy may have existed as
to whether or not the concept of gross income used in the old code,
which had basicly remained unchanged since 1913, was as broad
as the term "income" as used in the Sixteenth Amendment, has
now been removed. It would appear that the intent of Congress
in Section 61 of the new code was to make the concept of gross
income, except for the statutory exclusions, as broad as constitu-
tionally taxable income under the Sixteenth Amendment. But this
somewhat theoretical change does not affect the basic concept of
gross income. It is still the same dynamic concept it was under the
old code, limited by the same judicial decisions and administrative
rulings as to recovery of capital, severance, realization, legality,
etc.
STATUTORY EXCLUSIONS
The material changes made by the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 are not in the basic concept of gross income itself but in the
specific statutory inclusions and exclusions which the Congress has
chosen on public policy grounds to include or exclude from gross
income. These warrant detailed consideration.
ALIMONY AND SEPARATE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS
As you recall, the old law, Section 22(k), provided that pe-
riodic payments made under a decree of divorce or separate main-
tActing Dean of College of Business, Head of Accounting Department, Pro-
fessor of Accounting, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah.
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tenance or under a written instrument incident thereto was in-
cludable in the gross income of the wife. Installment payments
discharging a part of an obligation, the principal sum of which is,
in terms of money or property, specified in the decree, shall be con-
sidered periodic payments if such principal sum may be paid with-
in a period ending more than ten years from the date of the decree.
The new law makes two changes broadening this rule. First, Sec-
tion 71 (a) (2) provides that where husband and wife are separated,
not under a court decree, periodic payments made under a written
separation agreement, executed after August 16, 1954, and based
on the marital relationship, shall be income to the wife provided
husband and wife do not file a joint return. The second change in
Section 71 (a) (3) provides that where the wife is separated from
her husand, periodic payments received by the wife after August
16, 1954, under a decree entered after March 1, .1954, requiring
payments for support or maintenance, shall be includable in the
gross income of the wife providing no joint return is filed. This
latter provision will apparently cover all temporary alimony and
support decrees granted under statute, permitting temporary sup-
port and maintenance during the divorce proceedings. It will also
probably include periodic payments made under an interlocutory
decree where the decree does not become final for a statutory period
of time.
Payments made for support of minor children are still, as
under the old law, not includable in the gross income of the wife,
and the first payments made by the husband are considered to apply
first toward the support of the children.
PRIZES, AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS
Sections 74, 102 and 117 are related sections referring to gifts,
scholarships, prizes and awards. Section 102 is a re-enactment of
the exclusion of income from gifts, bequests, devises and inheri-
tances. Sections 74 and 117 are new and to an extent qualify the
gift rule. Section 74 (a) lays down the general rule that, except as
provided in Section 117, gross income includes amounts received
as prizes and awards. This is apparently intended to catch all com-
mercial prizes not coming under the exception in Section 74 (b). It
does not appear to require a lack of donative intent on the part of
the giver, nor does it appear to require a lack of consideration, a
lack of "something" passing from the receiver either to the giver
or to a third party as in the Washburn case 1 where the Tax Court
relied on the fact that the recipient had employed no capital, con-
tributed no labor, made no wager, and did not become involved in
any future obligations.
The exception to this general rule is then provided in Section
74(b). Gross income does not include amounts received as prizes
and awards given in recognition of religious, charitable, scientific,
IWashburn v. Commissioner, 5 TC 1333.
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educational, artistic, literary, or civic achievement, but only if (1)
the recipient was selected without any action on his part to enter
the contest, and (2) the recipient is not required to render sub-
stantial future services as a condition. What constitutes action on
the recipient's part to enter the contest? Does filing an entry blank
make the prize taxable? Also, what constitutes rendering substan-
tial future services? Is appearing on a program sufficient? Appar-
ently either one of these acts on the part of the recipient would
make the prize taxable.
Apparently this section is a partial codification of the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Robertson v. United
States,2 where the Court looked at the acceptance by the contestants
of the offer tendered by the sponsor as the creation of an enforce-
able contract discharged by the rendering of services.
Section 116 takes out of the category of prizes, amounts re-
ceived as scholarships and fellowships at educational institutions,
as well as services and accommodations supplied such as room and
board and amounts received and used to cover travel, research,
clerical help, or equipment which are incident to such scholarship
or fellowship.
If the student is a candidate for a degree at an educational
institution, Section 117(b) (1) states such grants are excludable
from gross income to the extent that no services are required other
than those ordinarily required of all candidates for the degree.
If the student or fellow is not a candidate for a degree, Section
117 (b) (2) provides no exclusion unless the grantor is a tax exempt
organization under Section 501 (a) or a governmental unit, and
then the exclusion is limited to $300 times the number of months
the grant is received up to a maximum of thirty-six months. Sec-
tion 117 (b) (2) on non-degree students, makes no reference as to
whether services are rendered or not. Apparently, however, if
services were required, the grant would be included in gross in-
come under the general provisions on compensation.
COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES OR SICKNESS
Sections 104, 105 and 106 provide a series of changes regard-
ing employee accident and sickness benefits. Under the old law,
amounts received as accident or health benefits under employer
pension plans were exempt if paid under a contract of insurance
but were taxable if paid under non-insured plans. The new law
places all plans financed by the employer on a parity, whether in-
sured or self-insured.
The rule under the new law is that amounts received from an
employer by an employee through accident or health insurance for
personal injuries or sickness generally are taxable to the extent




includable in the gross income of the employee or if paid directly
by the employer. But then three exceptions are made which take
most of the cases out of the general rule and make such payments
received by the employee non-taxable. The first exception applies if
received directly or indirectly by the taxpayer to reimburse him for
expenses he incurred for medical care of himself, his spouse or his
dependents which were not taken as a medical deduction under Sec-
tion 213 for a prior year. Under the tax benefit rule, amounts de-
ducted in a prior year for medical expenses from which a tax benefit
was received must be included in the gross income of the employee
in the years received. The second exception includes amounts re-
ceived by the employee for loss of a member, function or disfigure-
ment of the body and computed with reference to the nature of the
injury and not in relation to the time absent from work. The third
includes amounts received in lieu of wages, not exceeding $100 per
week paid due to absence from work due to injuries or sickness,
after the first seven calendar days of absence or the full period if
the employee was hospitalized at least one day on account of such
injury or sickness.
In each of these three exceptions the amounts received by the
employee would be excluded from gross income, whether paid as
a result of an insurance contract, direct by the employer, or under
a sickness and disability fund for employees maintained under the
laws of a state or territory.
Section 106 now provides by statute in broad language that
gross income of the employee does not include contributions made
by the employer to an accident and health plan, whether made
directly to the employee or by way of insurance premiums or
whether made for one or many employees. This differs consider-
ably from the law prior to the enactment of this section when only
premiums paid by the employer on group health and hospitaliza-
tion policies were excluded from gross income of the employee by
administrative ruling.
RENTAL VALUE OF PARSONAGE
Section 107 is an expansion of Section 22(b) (6) of the old
code which provided for exclusion from gross income of the rental
value of a dwelling furnished a minister of the gospel. The new
code expands this to include a rental allowance paid in cash if used
to rent or provide a home.
INCOME FROM DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS
Section 108 carries forward, and expands, the exception pro-
vided in the old code in Section 22(b) (9) to the rule that gain must
be recognized upon the non-gratuitious discharge of indebtedness
for less than its tax basis to the extent the taxpayer is solvent
after the discharge. The section has no bearing on those situations
coming under the American Dental Company decision:' where there
I Helvering v. American Dental Company, 318 U.S. 322.
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are direct negotiations between debtor and creditor and a gratui-
tious cancellation of the debt containing donative intent, lack of
consideration and the other elements for a valid gift. In such cases
no gain need be included in gross income. Section 108 does provide
an exception for those cases coming under the Kirby Lumber Com-
pany rule 4 where the elements of a valid gift are not present and
the debtor is solvent after the discharge. It permits the debtor to
exclude the gain from gross income to the extent that he reduces
the tax basis of certain property. It is based on the logical theory
that where a taxpayer is able to discharge his obligations for less
than their face value it is evidence of a decline in the value of his
property which is the security for his debts rather than evidence
of a taxable increase in his net worth. Under Section 22 (b) (9) of
the old law the exception was limited to debts of a corporation
evidenced by a security. Section 108 of the new law is broadened
to include all indebtedness of a corporation and indebtedness in-
curred or assumed by an individual in connection with property
used in his trade or business. The phrase used in case of an in-
dividual "in connection with property used in his trade or busi-
ness" will require some interpretation. Apparently there must be
some relationship between the indebtedness of the individual and
the property of the individual used in his trade or business. The
Report of the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate
in discussing this section uses the phrase "in connection with the
acquisition of property used in his trade or business."'5 This term
"acquisition," would further narrow the indebtedness qualifying
under the statute.
For.a discharge of indebtedness which does qualify under the
statute, the taxpayer may elect to exclude such gain from gross in-
come by filing a consent, to the regulations prescribed under Sec-
tion 1017, to have the amount excluded from gross income applied
in the reduction of the basis of any property held (whether before
or after the time of the discharge) by the taxpayer during any por-
tion of the taxable year in which the discharge occurred. The re-
duction shall be made as of the first day of the taxable year or as of
the date of acquisition if acquired during the year. While no regu-
lations have been issued on this section yet, Regulations 118, in-
terpreting similar language in the old code, stated that the re-
duction of basis of the assets was to be made in the following or-
der: (1) any specific property, whether or not subject to a pur-
chase money lien, if the indebtedness was incurred to purchase that
property; (2) any property (except inventory or notes and accounts
receivable) against which there was a lien other than a purchase
money lien; (3) all other property except inventory and receiv-
ables; (4) inventory and notes and accounts receivableA
4 United States v. Kirby Lumber Company, 294 U.S. 1.
5Report of the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate to ac-
company H. R. 8300, p. 186.
0 Stanley and Kilcullen, The Federal Income Tax, 1954 Code Edition,
Pamphlet No. 1, p. 60.
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INCOME TAXES PAID BY LESSEE
Section 110 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides for
a rather narrow exception to a general rule of income taxation
handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1929.
While the statutory exception itself is relatively unimportant, the
fact that it became necessary for the Congress to grant special
relief is of importance to tax practitioners. In Old Colony Trust
Company v. Commissioner,7 the United States Supreme Court held
that where there is a contractual agreement to receive income which
includes a promise by the payor to also pay the federal income tax
of the recipient on such income, the payment of the tax for the re-
cipient constitutes additional taxable income. This means for a
cash basis taxpayer that each year as the subsequent tax is paid,
it would become additional taxable income and could continue on
chronologically indefinitely if the contract were so interpreted un-
der the law of the state in which it was executed. If the recipient
of the income were reporting on the accrual basis, the Supreme
Court of the United States and the lower courts have apparently
approved the pyramiding of the tax. The formula for the compu-
tation of such a tax would be the amount of income originally paid
divided by 100 per cent minus the effective rate of tax. For ex-
ample, the tax on $1,000 of original income, if the recipient were
in the 20 per cent bracket, would be [1,000 - (100 - 20)] -
1,000, or $250. If the recipient were in a bracket where the effec-
tive rate of tax was 80 per cent, the pyramided tax on the original
$1,000 of income would be $4,000. As the effective rate of the tax
approaches 100 per cent, the tax on the original income will ap-
proach infinity. Section 110 provides special relief in certain cases
where a lease was entered into before January 1, 1954. If both
lessee and lessor are corporations and, under the lease, the lessee
is obligated to pay or to reimburse the lessor for any part of the
income tax imposed upon the lessor with respect to the rentals,
then such payments for the tax are excludable from the gross in-
come of the lessor and are not deductible by the lessee. The moral
to Section 110 is to avoid any contract which contains a promise
to pay the federal tax on certain income payments. The Congress
may not be so benevolent in granting relief by special legislation in
your case.
COMBAT PAY OF MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES
Section 112 re-enacts and extends the provisions of the old code
Section 22(b) (13) regarding combat pay of members of the armed
forces. Briefly, the provision excludes from gross income the
monthly compensation of an enlisted man and the first $200 per
month of a commissioned officer for any month during any part of
which the taxpayer served in a combat zone or was hospitalized
as a result of wounds, disease, or injury incurred while serving in
7 279 U.S. 716.
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a combat zone. As you recall, the President of the United States,
under the power granted him by this section, declared Korea and
adjacent waters a combat zone by executive order. This exclusion
provision, which would, under the old code, have expired December
31, 1954, is extended under Section 112 to cover any induction
period under present or future draft legislation.
Section 692 likewise extends the forgiveness features of old
Section 154 which would have expired January 1, 1955, to cover any
individual who dies during any induction period while in active
service in the armed forces in a combat zone or as a result of
wounds, disease, or injury incurred while so serving. His tax for
the year of death and any prior taxable year ending on or after the
first day he so served in a combat zone after June 24, 1950, are
forgiven. Also any prior years' taxes unpaid at the date of such
death are cancelled.
DIVIDEND EXCLUSIONS AND CREDITS
Section 116 contains the new provision for the partial ex-
clusion from gross income of dividends received by an individual. Its
companion measure, Section 34, provides a credit against the tax
based on dividends received by individuals. These two provisions
are a step in the direction of granting relief from double taxation
where income is received by an individual from a corporation where
the income has already been taxed against the corporate entity.
Both sections apply only to taxable years ending after July 31, 1954.
The credit provided in Section 34 is 4 per cent of the dividends
received after July 31, 1954, from domestic corporations and in-
cluded in gross income. Notice it applies only to dividends re-
ceived after July 31, 1954. There are two further limitations as
to the amount of such calculation which can be deducted. The
credit cannot exceed the tax as calculated less the foreign tax
credit. The tax cannot be reduced below zero. It also cannot ex-
ceed 2 per cent of taxable income for taxable years ending before
January 1, 1955, or 4 per cent of taxable income for years ending
after December 31, 1954.
Section 116 provides for an exclusion from gross income of an
individual of dividends up to $50 and shall apply to the dividends
first received in such year.
In case of a joint return, if each spouse owns in his or her
own name stocks producing dividends of $50 each, a $100 exclusion
is permitted. If the stocks are held in joint tenancy, the answer
is not clear whether $50 or $100 can be excluded, but there is some
precedent in the administrative holding that in case of partially
tax exempt bonds held in joint tenancy interest on principal in
the amount of $10,000 can be excluded on a joint return for doub-
ling the $50 exclusion. There is also an argument for excluding
$100 in those cases where under state law of a transfer in joint
tenancy, it cannot be shown that the grantor did not part with the
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beneficial title, dominion and control, and that he can revert the
beneficial title to the whole of the property to himself.
Neither the credit under Section 34 nor the exclusion under
Section 116 is allowed to non-resident aliens taxed under Section
871(a) (not engaged in business in the United States and gross
income of not more than $15,400). The credit under Section 34
is not available to a taxpayer who files form 1040A (Section
6014 (a)) but is apparently available to an individual filing the
short form. The exclusion is apparently available in either case.
The term "dividends" used in both sections refers to dividends
from domestic corporations and implies dividends as defined in
Section 316. The intent of the statute is to allow the benefit only
in those cases where the income has been previously subject to the
corporate tax. Certain types of dividends are specifically disquali-
fied from the benefit by statute due to the type of corporation mak-
ing the distribution (Section 34(c) and 116(b)). Falling in this
category are life insurance companies, China Trade Act corpora-
tions, exempt charitable organizations, exempt farmers' coopera-
tive associations, and corporations engaged in business with pos-
sessions of the United States.
Further limitations on dividends which may qualify are those
implied in Section 316, that the distribution be out of earnings and
profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, or out of earnings
and profits of the taxable year. Thus, any distribution represent-
ing a return of capital would not qualify, even though it might
exceed the taxpayer's basis and be taxable as capital gain. For the
ordinary corporation, a distribution out of capital gains to the
corporation would qualify. In case of a regulated invested com-
pany, capital gains returned to shareholders as dividends do not
qualify; earnings' dividends do qualify, subject to limitations pro-
vided in Section 854.
One other point, if the stock is owned by a partnership, Section
702 (a) (5) provides that each partner shall take into account sep-
arately his distributive share of the partnership's qualifying divi-
dends received both for the credit under Section 34 and the ex-
clusions under Section 116. In other words, the benefits are not
lost where the income is funneled through a partnership.
Likewise, in case of an estate or trust, Section 642 (a) (3) pro-
vides that both the benefit of the credit and the exclusion will apply
to both the fiduciary or the beneficiaries, depending on whether the
income was distributed or distributable.
MEALS AND LODGING FURNISHED FOR CONVENIENCE OF EMPLOYER
The last new sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
which I was asked to cover are 119 and 120, relating to meals or
lodging furnished an employee. The general rule still applies that
meals and lodging furnished an employee by his employer are a
form of income in kind and includable in gross income. Section
119 now codifies, with some changes, the exception to this general
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rule laid down by both judicial decisions and administrative rul-
ings, that where the meals and/or lodging were furnished for the
convenience of the employer, their value was excludable from gross
income. But under the new code, the meals must be furnished on
business premises of the employer; and in case of lodging, the
employee is required to accept such lodging on the business prem-
ises of this employer. In one respect the new code is a broadening
of the convenience of the employer rule. Under the old rulings,
the convenience of the employer test was applied to determine
whether or not the item was income or compensation at all; under
the new code, it is an exclusion. If the parties had agreed by con-
tract that the meals and/or lodging were a part of the compensa-
tion, that was final. Under Section 118, even though the meals and
lodging are made part of compensation by "the provisions of an
employment contract or of state statute fixing terms of employ-
ment," the value thereof may still be excluded from gross income
specifically by the new code.
However, the old test as to what constitutes "for the conven-
ience of the employer" will apparently still apply. The furnishing
of meals and lodging must be essential to the performance of the
employment, with the major benefit therefrom accruing to the
employer and only an incidental benefit running to the employee.
In other words, not all meals and lodging furnished on the premises
are non-taxable to the employee under the new code.
Section 120, which is new, provides for the exclusion of a statu-
tory subsistence allowance not exceeding $5 per day received by a
police officer of a state, territory, or local government. Amounts
excluded under this provision cannot be deducted as expenses, ex-
cept insofar as the expenses exceed the allowance.
SITUATION WANTED
Young (26) attorney, presently practicing in
Chicago, desires association with a Denver law firm.
Illinois graduate, member of Illinois and Michigan
Bars. Address all inquiries to Box 11, 525 Mile High
Center, Denver 2, Colorado.
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EXPLANATION OF CERTAIN PERSONAL AND
NON-BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS UNDER
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954
CHARLES A. ZARINI, C.P.A., Colorado
In preparing this paper, I should mention that wherever
possible, I have tried for purposes of clarity to translate the tech-
nical language of the 1954 code into what I might term explana-
tory language. I have found this translation chore rather difficult
for the reason that the only sources of material, besides the techni-
cal language of the new code provisions themselves, were reports
of the congressional committees which indicated the intent of the
lawmakers. The ordinarily reliable source of regulations is not yet
available, and it will take some time to get court decisions deciding
the issues which will arise under the new provisions. The other
primary source of information was New Revenue Code of '54
Explained, from which I have used a number of examples. These
examples, I found, are primarily those contained in the House and
Senate committee reports except for some re-editing which ap-
peared to me to improve the presentation. Finally, I should state
that, as much as possible, my paper is confined to only the new or
amended provisions of certain sections of the 1954 code dealing
with personal and non-business deductions.
ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME DEFINED--SECTION 62
Section 62 of the Revenue Code of 1954, entitled "Adjusted
Gross Income Defined," corresponds to Section 22(n) of the 1939
code. As you recall, the term "adjusted gross income" means, in
the case of an individual, gross income minus certain specific de-
ductions. The new Section 62 provides for substantially the same
deductions as the old law, except that two new deductions for
employees have been added in paragraph (2), namely, subpara-
graph (c) dealing with transportation expenses of employees and
subparagraph (d) dealing with expenses of outside salesmen. I
will confine my discussion to these two new provisions.
Transportation expenses which are "ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business" and are not "personal, living or family
expenses" are allowed as a deduction from gross income in arriving
at adjusted gross income. The term "transportation" as used here
is a narrower concept than "travel" under prior law and does not
include meals and lodging, but includes only the cost of transport-
ing the employee from one place to another in connection with his
employment when he is not away from home in travel status. As
in the old law, if the employee is away from home in travel status,
his expenses would be deductible from gross income under sub-
paragraph (b) of this section. Thus, the transportation expenses
incurred by employees in connection with their employment now
constitute deductions from gross income and not only include
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transportation purchased, such as taxi fares and automobile rental,
but also the cost of operating personally-owned automobiles, in-
cluding gasoline, oil, repairs and depreciation. It should be again
noted that such expenses are allowable deductions only when in-
curred in connection with employment. Accordingly, these expenses
must be equitably prorated if a portion thereof includes "personal,
living or family expenses." In this connection, it should be pointed
out that the Senate Finance Committee report states that trans-
portation expenses under Section 62 do not include the expense
of commuting to and from work.
Subparagraph (d) of this section also added a new deduction
from gross income for outside salesmen. The Senate Finance Com-
mittee report defines an "outside salesman" as a full-time salesman
who solicits business away from his employer's place of business.
It does not include a salesman, a principal part of whose activities
consist of service and delivery. Thus, a bread driver-salesman or
a milk driver-salesman would not be included in the definition. Also
not within the definition are salesmen whose principal activities
consist of selling at the employer's place of business but who inci-
dentally make outside calls. However, these salesmen would be
eligible for a deduction of transportation expenses previously dis-
cussed. Outside salesmen who have incidental activities at the
employer's place of business, such as writing and transmitting
orders or making and receiving telephone calls, will still be eligible
for the deduction to "outside salesman." Under the old law, an
"outside salesman" who was an employee could, like any other
employee, deduct expenses connected with his employment in com-
puting adjusted gross income only if the expenses were reimbursed
or if they were "travel expenses." Under the new code, full-time
outside salesmen who solicit business away from their employer's
place of business are allowed to deduct from gross income the
actual ordinary and necessary expenses of soliciting such business,
whether or not the expenses are reimbursed. Such expenses as the
cost of telephone and telegraph, secretarial help, entertainment,
meals, split commissions, etc., can therefore be deducted.
Of course, as under the old law, taxpayers determining their
adjusted gross income by deducting these new allowable transpor-
tation and outside salesmen expenses from gross income may, if
they so elect, take the standard deduction in addition.
These changes are effective with respect to taxable years be-
ginning after December 31, 1953.
EXPENSES FOR CARE OF CERTAIN DEPENDENTS-SECTION 214
An entirely new deduction has been created by Section 214
providing for an extremely limited allowance to working mothers
or widowers who, in order that they may earn a living, must pay
others to care for their children. "Widower" is defined as a di-
vorced man or one who is separated from his wife under a decree
of separate maintenance at the close of the taxable year, as well as
a man whose spouse has died and who has not remarried. In gen-
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eral, the complex provisions, including the limitations, are as
follows:
(1) The maximum deduction is $600 per year, re-
gardless of how many children the taxpayer has and how
much more than $600 may have been paid for their care.
If less than $600 was paid, then only the amount actually
spent is deductible.
(2) A working wife will be allowed the deduction
only if she files a joint return with her husband. If their
combined adjusted gross income is more than $4,500, the
excess over $4,500 will reduce the deduction for child care
expenses. Thus, if they have a combined adjusted gross
income of $5,100 or more, they lose the deduction. How-
ever, if the husband is incapable of self-support because
he is mentally or physically defective, the joint-return and
$4,500 limitations do not apply. A woman is not "married"
if she is divorced or separated from her husband under a
decree of separate maintenance at the close of the taxable
year, and under such circumstances the limitations in this
paragraph do not apply.
(3) The care of the child or children must be for the
purpose of enabling the taxpayer to be gainfully employed.
(4) The expenses must be paid in the year in which
they are incurred.
(5) Payments to a relative for caring for the child
qualify as long as the taxpayer is not permitted the de-
pendency deduction for the relative. For example, if a
widower pays his mother $500 to look after his children
during the year, and he furnishes more than one-half of
his mother's support and is allowed her dependency de-
duction, he cannot deduct the $500 as child-care expense.
(6) The child must be the taxpayer's son, stepson,
daughter or stepdaughter, and must be under twelve years
of age. If any dependent is physically or mentally inca-
pable of self-care, expenses paid for his or her care for the
purpose of enabling the taxpayer to be gainfully em-
ployed are deductible.
(7) A divorced or separated mother may claim the
child-care deduction even though the father supports the
child and claims the $600 dependency deduction.
(8) Amounts which are actually deducted as child-
care expenses cannot also be treated as medical expenses
(as provided by Section 213).
(9) Child-care expenses cannot be deducted if the
taxpayer elects to use the standard deduction.
Only those expenses incurred up to the time the child reaches
the age of twelve will be deductible. If a taxpayer is gainfully
employed during only part of the time during which the child is
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cared for, only a proportionate amount of the expense is deductible.
The following are a few examples to illustrate these points:
(1) W, a widow, pays $60 per month for the care of
her son in order that she may work. The son, who attends
school, was twelve years old on June 1 of the taxable year.
W paid $300 for his care from January 1 to June 1, and
$420 for his care during the rest of the year. Only $300 is
deductible.
(2) Taxpayer, a widow, places her four-year-old son
in a nursery school on January 2, 1954. She pays $50 per
month for his care during the entire year. Taxpayer ac-
tually works during only three months of 1954. Only $150
of the child-care expenses can be deducted. If the taxpayer
spent part of the time actively job-hunting, the child-care
expense attributable to such period also would be de-
ductible. In such case, the purpose of the child care also
would be to enable the taxpayer to be gainfully employed.
(3) Taxpayer, a widow, takes her three-year-old
daughter to a nursery school at 7 a.m. each morning from
Monday to Friday, and picks her up at 5 p.m. Taxpayer
works from 8 a.m. to 12 noon during each of those days.
She pays $10 a week for the care of the child. Since tax-
payer works only half days, only the proportion of the
child-care expense allocable to such period can be de-
ducted. Such period is 7 a.m. to noon, or one-half of the
time spent by the child in the nursery school. Conse-
quently, one-half of the $10 weekly cost, or $5 per week, is
deductible.
(4) W, a widow, who works full time, employs a
housekeeper for $25 per week. The housekeeper does the
cooking, housework and laundry, and looks after W's chil-
dren, one six and the other fourteen, both of whom attend
school. Assume that one-half of the housekeeper's time is
spent looking after the children. Of the annual wages of
$1,300, therefore, one-half or $650 is allocable to care of
the children to enable W to be gainfully employed. The
maximum deduction, however, is $600. The Report of the
Ways and Means Committee states that W will be allowed
to deduct $600 under the foregoing circumstances, even
though one child is over twelve. According to the report,
after a portion of the housekeeper's wage is allocated to
child care, it will not be further allocated between the chil-
dren under twelve years of age and those who are twelve
or older.
This new provision which becomes effective for taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1953, was adopted for the reason
that it was recognized that a widow, a widower, or low-income
families with small children must incur child-care expenses in
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order to earn a living and that, in fact, such expenses are com-
parable to an employee's business expenses. As a side light, the
Senate Finance Committee report estimates that this new provision
will reduce revenues in the 1955 fiscal year by $130 million. I made
no attempt to estimate the number of widows and widowers with
children we must have in this country to cause such an anticipated
loss in revenue.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, ETC., EXPENSES-SECTION 213
This section, while similar in theory to that contained in the
1939 Code, also provides for some radical changes designed to
afford additional tax relief to taxpayers who elect to itemize
deductions. Except for a taxpayer or his spouse who has attained
the age of sixty-five before the close of the taxable year, the allow-
ance for medical expenses has been increased by permitting taxpay-
ers to deduct medical expenses in excess of 3 per cent of adjusted
gross income. This is tantamount to an increased medical expense
allowance equal to 2 per cent of adjusted gross income since prior
law limited the deduction to an amount which exceeded 5 per cent
of adjusted gross income. This 3 per cent limitation does not apply
if either the taxpayer or his spouse has attained the age of 65 be-
fore the close of the taxable year. Such taxpayers may claim as a
deduction all medical expenses paid during the taxable year, except
that the 3 per cent limitation does apply to dependents of such
taxpayers. However, in computing medical expenses, a taxpayer,
regardless of age, can take into account amounts paid for medicine
and drugs only to the extent that they exceed 1 per cent of adjusted
gross income. The Senate Finance Committee report states that
the amount paid for medicine and drugs includes those purchased
without a prescription but makes it crystal clear that medicines
and drugs do not include expenditures for toiletries and sundry
items.
Example
Taxpayer under 65 has adjusted gross income for
1954 of $6,000. During the year, he paid a doctor $300 and
paid a $100 hospital bill. He also spent $100 for medicine
and drugs. His medical expenses deduction will be com-
puted as follows:
Medicine and drugs (excess of $100 over
1% of $6,000) ------------------------------------------------------ $ 40
Doctor ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 300
Hospital ---------------------------------------------------------- 100.............. 
Total medical expenses (none of which is com-
pensated by insurance or otherwise) --------- 440
Amount not deductible (3% of $6,000) ------------------------ 180
Medical expense deduction ---------------------------------------- $260
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If this taxpayer were 65 or over and none of the medical
expenses were attributable to his dependents other than his
spouse, the entire $440 would constitute his medical deduction,
since in this case the 3 per cent limitation would not apply. Please
note again, however, that the 1 per cent of adjusted gross limita-
tion for medicine and drugs applies regardless of age.
The maximum medical expense deduction per exemption
claimed on a return has been doubled from $1,250 to $2,500. Fur-
thermore, the over-all limitations on medical deductions have been
doubled for separate and joint returns and actually quadrupled
for the return of the head of a household. These new limitations
are $5,000 on a separate return and $10,000 on a joint return, a
return of a surviving spouse and a return of the head of a house-
hold.
Section 213 defines medical care to mean amounts paid for
the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease
or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the
body (including amounts paid for accident or health insurance),
or for transportation primarily for and essential to such medical
care. The deduction permitted for "transportation primarily for
and essential to medical care" clarifies prior law in that it specifi-
cally excludes deduction of any meals and lodging (unless included
in a hospital bill) while away from home receiving medical treat-
ment.
Example
A lives in Chicago. His doctor prescribes an appen-
dectomy. A travels to California in order to have the oper-
ation performed there. The cost of transporting A to Cali-
fornia is not a medical expense, because, although he may
have gone there "primarily" for medical care, the trip was
not "essential" to medical care. The operation could as
well have been performed in Chicago. The transportation
must be both "primarily for and essential to medical
care." This feature will now make it rather difficult to
take "vacation" travel as a medical expense.
On the other hand, if a doctor prescribes that a pa-
tient must go to Florida in order to alleviate specific
chronic ailments and to escape unfavorable climatic condi-
tions which have proven injurious to the health of the
taxpayer, and the travel is prescribed for reasons other
than the general improvement of a patient's health, the
cost of the patient's transportation to Florida would be
deductible but not his living expenses while there.
Section 213 makes a further amendment to prior law pro-
viding that expenses for the medical care of the decedent paid out
of his estate within one year from the date of his death shall be
treated as paid by the decedent at the time such expenses were
incurred. This provision permits, upon payment of such expenses
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by the estate within one year from the date of decedent's death,
the deduction of the amounts paid in the year in which they were
incurred by the decedent. While in the normal case this will be in
the taxable year for which decedent's last return is filed, it will
also permit the filing of an amended return or claim for refund
for a year with respect to which a refund or deficiency is not
barred by the statute of limitations.
Example
In 1953, A incurred but did not pay doctor and hos-
pital bills totaling $400 for personal medical treatment.
He filed his return for the calendar year 1953 on March
15, 1954, and paid the tax shown to be due. A dies in Janu-
ary, 1955, without having paid the doctor and hospital
bills. His estate pays them in March, 1955. An amended
return (or refund claim) can be filed for 1953, and the
allowable medical expenses can be deducted in that year,
prior to expiration of the statute of limitations, ordinarily
three years from the due date of the return, which in this
case was March 15, 1954.
It should be noted that this new deduction is not permitted
where the amount so paid is also allowable in computing the net
estate of the decedent for estate tax purposes, unless a statement
is filed that the deduction has not been claimed or allowed for
estate tax purposes, together with a waiver of the right to claim
such as an estate tax deduction. It should also be noted that the
allowance of a deduction of a decedent's medical expenses in the
year in which they are incurred applies only to the expenses in-
curred for the deceased taxpayer himself and not to medical
expenses which a decedent may have incurred on behalf of a de-
pendent. The statute expressly provides such treatment only for
"expenses for the medical care of the taxpayer."
As pointed out before, medical expense allowed as child-care
expense under Section 214 may not be treated as an expense paid
for medical care.
These changes are also effective with respect to taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1953.
CHARITABLE, ETC., CONTRIBUTIONS AND GIFTS-SECTION 170
The major change from prior law governing the allowance
of charitable contributions paid by taxpayers who elect to itemize
deductions is the increase of the permissible maximum allowance
from 20% to 30% of adjusted gross income, provided that at least
10% of adjusted gross income represents gifts and contributions
made to churches, educational organizations, and hospitals. Such
charitable contributions must be paid to such organizations and
not just for the use of those organizations. Accordingly, payments
to a trust for the benefit of such organizations would not qualify
under this special rule. In other words, the additional allowance is
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not a general increase but a special increase which will have to
be considered separately, as follows:
A's adjusted gross income for 1954 is $15,000. During
the year, he made the following gifts: State University,
$2,000; First Baptist Church, $500; other qualifying con-
tributions to Red Cross, Community Chest, etc., totaling
$2,200. His allowable deductions for charitable contribu-
tions are computed as follows:
Under 10% limitation:
State University ---------------------------------------------- $2,000
First Baptist Church ---------------------------------------- 500
2,500
10% of $15,000 ------------------------------------------------ 1,500
Balance, to be deducted under the 20% limitation ---- $1,000
Other qualifying contributions -------------------------- 2,200
Total contributions under 20% limitation -------------. 3,200
20% of $15,000 ------------------------------------------------ 3,000
Excess, or nondeductible, contributions ----------------- $ 200
As you can see from this illustration, the amount allowable
under the 10% limitation is $1,500 and the amount allowable under
the 20% limitation is $3,000, making a total allowance of $4,500
or 30% of adjusted gross income of $15,000. This is so because in
this illustration the taxpayer actually paid $2,500, or more than
10% of the adjusted gross income of $15,000, to the specific quali-
fying organizations, in this case the church and the university.
Using this same set of facts, except assume that $750 had been
paid to the State University and the balance of $3,950 in contri-
butions paid to other charitable organizations, the maximum allow-





State U niversity ---------------------------- $ 750
10% of $15,000 adjusted
gross income ------------- 1,500 750
Under 20% limitation:
Other charitable contributions .... 3,950
20% of $15,000 adjusted
gross income ------------------------- 3,000 3,000
Total Charitable Contribution Deduction ------------ $3,750
This additional 10% allowance was actually designed to provide
an incentive to contribute larger amounts to churches, educational
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institutions and hospitals to counteract their rising costs and rela-
tively low rate of return from endowment funds.
No limit on charitable contributions is imposed when the
combination of the taxpayer's contributions and income taxes in
the current year and eight of the preceding ten years equals 90%
or more of his taxable income. Prior law contained a similar pro-
vision providing for the use of the current year and each of the
ten preceding years in making this determination. That's real
leniency for you.
Under prior law, the net operating loss carry-back could cause
a reduction in the charitable contribution deduction in the prior
year due to the reduction in the adjusted gross income of that
earlier year. Section 170 now contains a provision eliminating the
necessity for considering the carry-back in computing adjusted
gross income for the purpose of applying the following limitations:
(1) The regular 20% limitation on contributions.
(2) The special 10% limitation on contributions.
Likewise, Section 170 also eliminates the necessity for considering
the net operating loss carry-back in computing the taxable income
for the purpose of applying the 90% rule of unlimited deductions
for certain individuals as well as determining taxable income for
the purpose of applying the 5% contribution limitation upon cor-
porations.
Another new provision of Section 170 denies a deduction for
certain charitable contributions or gifts which represent interest
in property transferred to a trust after March 9, 1954. This para-
graph operates if the grantor has a reversionary interest in the
corpus or income for which a deduction would otherwise be allow-
able and at the time of transfer the value of the reversionary inter-
est exceeds 5% of the value of such property.
Still another new provision of this section permits a deduction
for contributions to certain non-profit cemetery companies. Such
a company must be owned and operated exclusively for the benefit
of its lot owners who hold such lots for bona fide burial purposes
and not for purposes of resale.
The new law defines "charitable contributions" in about the
same way as the old law except certain minor changes were made
to eliminate obsolete material and to obtain clarity and uniformity
with respect to the types of contributions allowed as deductions
by individuals and corporations. All of these changes, except con-
tributions of interest in property transferred after March 9, 1954,
become effective with respect to taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1953.
Since the matter of contributions affecting corporations will
be covered in another paper, I will not go into that phase here,
other than to state that the 5% limitation has been retained and
corporations have been granted a two-year carry-over privilege
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to absorb excess contributions. This carry-over provision of excess
contributions is not available to individuals.
CERTAIN AMOUNTS PAID IN CONNECTION WITH
INSURANCE CONTRACTS-SECTION 264
Section 264 contains certain provisions not in prior law. As
you know, under prior law, there was a prohibition regarding the
interest deduction in the case of indebtedness, incurred or con-
tinued, to purchase a single-premium life insurance or endowment
contract. Likewise, under prior law, if substantially all the premi-
ums on a life insurance or endowment contract were paid within
four years from the date the contract was purchased, the interest
applicable to funds borrowed to pay the premiums was not an
allowable deduction. Provisions have now been made in Section
264 to extend these disallowances of interest on indebtedness in-
curred to purchase single-premium annuity contracts as well as
single-premium life insurance or endowment contracts; and to
provide for the denial of interest deductions, where, in lieu of the
payment of a substantial number of premiums within four years
from the date of the contract, the purchaser deposits borrowed
funds with the insurance company for the payment of future
premiums. Both of these extended provisions apply only to de-
posits made after March 1, 1954. These new provisions were de-
signed to curb tax avoidance schemes widely merchandised by cer-
tain insurance people in recent years and alleged to be very at-
tractive to people in high income tax brackets because of the tax
savings resulting from the interest deduction. Since the passage of
the Revenue Code of 1954, I have seen at least one new scheme
designed to qualify the interest on the indebtdness as deductible
through the rather simple maneuver of increasing premiums to
such an extent that annual premium amounts can be borrowed
against the accelerated increase in cash values. This contract
further provides that the amount payable upon death is the face
amount of the policy plus the accumulated cash value which is
invariably equal to the loan, permitting its extinguishment, leaving
the beneficiary the face amount of such policy. If interest on such
a policy can be deductible under this new law, it appears to me
that it is only a matter of time until amendments will be made to
the 1954 code to eliminate the interest deduction applicable to any
of these further tax avoidance schemes.
INTEREST-SECTION 163
Subsection (a) of Section 163 continues the deduction for
interest contained in Section 23(b) of the 1939 code. Under prior
law administration practice has denied any deduction for carrying
charges on installment purchases unless the interest factor were
separately stated. Subsection (b) of Section 163 now provides for
the deduction of certain carrying charges as interest in the event
the interest charge cannot be ascertained. Whenever there is a
contract for the purchase of personal property on an installment
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plan and there is a stated carrying charge, finance charge, service
charge or the like, a portion of the charge may be treated as if it
were interest. The amount of the interest deduction is computed
by taking 6% of the sum of the unpaid balances under the contract
at the beginning of each month beginning in the taxable year and
dividing by 12. This can be illustrated as follows:
Taxpayer buys a television set on June 8, 1954, for
$301, plus an additional carrying charge of $24, payable
$25 down and the balance in twelve equal installments due
on the first day of each month. Assuming that taxpayer is
on the cash and calendar-year basis and that he makes no
other installment purchases in 1954, the portion of the
carrying charge deductible as interest is computed as fol-
lows:
Unpaid balance and carrying charge outstanding:
January to June ------- ..................--------------------- $ 0.00
July 1 ($325 m inus $25) -------------------------------- 300.00
A u g u st 1 -------------------------------------..-------------...... 2 7 5 .0 0
September 1 ------------- .............-------------------------- 250.00
October 1 -------------------..........----------------------------- 225.00
November 1 -------------------------------------------------- 200.00
December 1 -------------------------------------------------- 175.00
Sum of unpaid balances ---....................------------------- $1,425.00
Average unpaid balance ($1,425 divided by 12) $ 118.75
Interest deduction (6% of $118.75) ----------- $ 7.13
The portion of the carrying charge deductible as interest can-
not exceed the total carrying charges allocable to the taxable year.
Assume the same facts as in the example above. The
$24 carrying charges are allocable to a twelve-month
period at the rate of $2 per month, so that the amount
allocable to July-December is $12. Since the interest com-
puted above is less than the $12 in carrying charges al-
locable to the last half of 1954, the full $7.13 can be de-
ducted.
In computing the amount to be treated as interest if the obli-
gation to pay is terminated as, for example, in the case of a repos-
session of property, the unpaid balance will be zero.
This new provision does not affect the treatment of amounts
of interest which are separately stated or definitely ascertainable
and hence deductible under the general rules of subsection (a).
Interest deductible as business expense or as expenses paid or
incurred for the production of income are also unaffected by this
new provision.
This change is effective with respect to taxable years begin-
ning after December 31, 1953. Accordingly, payments during such
taxable years will be subject to this new treatment without regard




The 1939 code provisions relating to the allowance of a de-
duction for worthless debts, the basis for determining the amount
of the deduction, and the permission to use a reserve for bad debts
are all retained in Section 166 without any substantive changes.
However, subsection (d) of Section 166 relating to non-business
bad debts of taxpayers other than corporations contains one im-
portant change which was not in prior law at Section 23(k) (4).
Non-business bad debts continue to be treated as short-term capital
losses. In addition to specifically excluding from the definition of
non-business bad debts those debts which become worthless in the
course of the trade or business of the taxpayer, a second specific
exclusion has been added. Under this added provision, a debt which
is either created in the course of the trade or business of the tax-
payer or is acquired by him in the course thereof without regard
to the relationship of the debt to a trade or business of the tax-
payer at the time that debt becomes worthless shall not be treated
as a non-business bad debt. Such a debt is a business bad debt under
the new law, and, therefore, is deductible in full rather than as a
short-term capital loss.
An entirely new provision relating to the tax treatment of
losses by guarantors of certain non-corporate obligations has been
added by subsection (f) of Section 166. This sub-section allows a
deduction for the loss suffered by a non-corporate taxpayer
through payment during the taxable year of all or part of his
obligation as a guarantor, endorser or indemnitor of a non-cor-
porate obligation. In order to obtain an ordinary loss, the taxpayer
must establish that the proceeds of the loan were used in the trade
or business of the borrower and that the obligation of the bor-
rower, to the person to whom the taxpayer made payment in dis-
charge of his guarantor's obligation, was worthless at the time of
such payment without regard to the guaranty, endorsement, or
indemnity. These changes are effective with respect to taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1953.
Worthless securities are not a part of Section 166 but continue
to be treated as a loss from the sale of a capital asset on the last
day of the taxable year under Section 165 of the new code.
AMORTIZABLE BOND PREMIUM-SECTION 171
This section corresponds to Section 125 of the 1939 code, pro-
viding a deduction for the amortization of bond premium by the
holder of a bond. Under prior law the premium could, at the elec-
tion of the taxpayer, be amortized to maturity, or the date on which
the bond was first callable. Thus, in the case of a $100 bond which
was purchased for $110 and which was callable on
days notice, that part of the premium which represents the differ-
ence between the purchase and the call price, or $5, could be amor-
tized in a single year. The congressional committees felt that this
was a loophole which should be stopped and, accordingly, Section
171 of the new law provides a limitation on the right to amortize
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the bond premium to the earlier call date. Under this limitation,
if the earlier call date is a date not more than three years after
date of issuance of the bond, the premium must be amortized to
the date of maturity of the bond. This provision has been made
applicable only with respect to bonds issued after January 22, 1951,
and acquired by the taxpayer after January 22, 1954. The require-
ment for amortization to maturity is limited to fully taxable bonds.
In addition, if an amortizable bond is called before maturity, the
taxpayer may deduct from ordinary income, in the year the bond
is called, the unamortized bond premium. The deduction cannot
exceed an amount equal to the excess of the adjusted basis of the
bond at the beginning of the taxable year over the amount re-
ceived on redemption or payable on maturity, if more than the
redemption price. The effect of this provision is illustrated as
follows:
Taxpayer owns a wholly taxable bond issued January
1, 1954, and acquired January 1, 1955. He paid $109 for
the bond which matures in ten years from date of issue or
nine years from date of acquisition. The bond is callable at
$105 upon thirty days notice. The bond is called December
31, 1956, for $105.
C o st 1 / 1 / 5 5 ------------------..-----------------------------------------......... $ 1 0 9
Am ortization- year 1955 ----------------------....................... 1
Adjusted basis 1/1/56 ------------------ _----------------------- 108
Call price 12/31/56 .....----------------------------------------------- 105
Amount of unamortizable premium which may be de-
ducted against ordinary income in 1955 ----------- $ 3
In addition to these changes the definition of a bond now eliminates
the requirement that the instrument must have attached interest
coupons or be in registered form.
In the case bonds are held by an estate or trust, the election
shall be exercised only by the fiduciary. With respect to bonds held
by a partnership, the election is exercisable only by the partnership.
EXPENSES FOR PRODUCTION OF INCOME--SECTION 212
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a de-
duction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year
(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of
property held for the production of income; or
(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or re-
fund of any tax.
Paragraphs (1) and (2) correspond to Section 23 (a) (2) of
the 1939 code while Paragraph (3) is new. The new provision, ef-
fective with respect to taxable years beginning after December
31, 1953, is designed to permit the deduction by an individual for
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legal and other expenses paid or incurred in connection with a
contested tax liability, whether the contest be federal, state or
municipal taxes, or whether the tax be income, estate, gift, prop-
erty, etc. Any expenses incurred in contesting any liability col-
lected as a tax or as part of the tax will be deductible. Because of
the tax relief involved, this provision may encourage litigation of
many nuisance-tax assessments.
AMOUNTS REPRESENTING TAXES AND INTEREST PAID TO
COOPERATIVE HOUSING CORPORATION-SECTION 216
This section re-enacts, in revised form, Section 23(z) of the
1939 code, which in effect allowed tenant-stockholders in a co-
operative apartment corporation the same deductions for property
taxes and interest available to a homeowner. This provision has
been extended in Section 216 to allow this same treatment of an
allowance for a proportionate share of property taxes and interest
to stockholder-tenants in a cooperative development of homes and
is effective with respect to taxable years beginning after December
31, 1953.
PREAMBLE
"In America, where the stability of Courts and of all depart-
ments of government rests upon the approval of the people, it is
peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dispensing
Justice be developed to a high point of efficiency and so maintained
that the public shall have absolute confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of its administration. The future of the Republic, to a
great extent, depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure and
unsullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the
motives of the members of our profession are such as to merit the
approval of all just men.
No code or set of rules can be framed, which will particularize
all the duties of the lawyer in the varying phases of litigation or
in all the relations of professional life. The following canons of
ethics are adopted by the American Bar Association as a general
guide, yet the enumeration of particular duties should not be con-
strued as a denial of the existence of others equally imperative,
though not specifically mentioned.
CANON 1. THE DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO THE COURTS.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme im-
portance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are
peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust
criticism and clamor. Whenever there is proper ground for serious
complaint of a judicial officer, it is the right and duty of the lawyer
to submit his grievances to the proper authorities. In such cases,
but not otherwise, such changes should be encouraged and the
person making them should be protected."
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Notes From The Secretary
As mentioned on a previous page, this issue inaugurates a new
policy in the publication of DICTA. It is the first bi-monthly issue
to be published.
If you have read this far without laying aside the publication,
you should realize that this is a new "twist" also. In each issue a
few pages have been set aside for the use of the Secretary. From
time to time we will publish Committee reports, opinions of the
Attorney-General, the Canons of Ethics, book reviews, and other
items of interest. We are also planning a limited classified section
for situations wanted, books for sale, etc. It is not necessarily in-
tended as a supplement to the Newsbulletin, but will include items
that are not deemed appropriate for that publication.
I hope that you will feel the "Notes" to be a necessary inclusion
in DICTA, and I certainly welcome any suggestions or criticisms
you may wish to make concerning them.
On the previous page you will notice the publication of the
Preamble and Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. These
Canons were adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908.
The Canons, as amended, were adopted by the Supreme Court of
Colorado in 1953. They are the standards of conduct which govern
your profession and should be diligently read and studied periodi-
cally. We will publish one or more of them in each issue.
Some problems that have arisen recently under the Canons
involve Canon 27-Advertising, Direct or Indirect. The Ethics and
Grievances Committees of both The Denver and Colorado Bar
Associations are somewhat disturbed with the individual interpre-
tations of this canon and have had to reprimand various attorneys
and firms for its violation. Any practice you think might be ques-
tionable probably is. So if you have any questions, don't hesitate
to call or write the Committee for an opinion.
The Bar Association office has received some complaints con-
cerning the Dicta index. This index was prepared, printed, and isbeing distributed by the University of Denver College of Law.
They are attempting to satisfy all requests as soon as possible.
Although some of you have probably waited an undue length of
time since putting in your order, I have been assured that the
situation is being corrected and that you will receive your copy in
the mail by April 1.
P.S. Richard Dittemore of Julesburg is looking for a used legal
form cabinet with 20 or 25 trays. If you know of one for sale,




The following publishers of law lists and legal directories have
received certificates of compliance from the Standing Committee
on Law Lists of the American Bar Association for their 1954
editions.
COMMERCIAL LAW LISTS
A. C. A. List, Associated Commercial Attorneys List, 165 Broad-
way, New York 6, New York.
American Lawyers Quarterly, The American Lawyers Company,
1712 N.B.C. Building, Cleveland 14, Ohio.
B. A. Law List, The B. A. Law List Company, 414 Colby-Abbot
Bldg., 759 No. Milwaukee St., Milwaukee 2, Wis.
Clearing House Quarterly, Attorneys National Clearing House Co.,
1645 Hennepin Avenue, Minneapolis 3, Minnesota.
The Columbia List, The Columbia Directory Company, Inc., 320
Broadway, New York 71 New York.
The Commercial Bar, The Commercial Bar, Inc., 521 Fifth Av-
enue, New York 17, New York.
C-R-C Attorney Directory, The C-R-C Law List Company, Inc.,
50 Church Street, New York 7, New York.
Forwarders List of Attorneys, Forwarders List Company, 38
South Dearborn Street, Chicago 3, Illinois.
The General Bar, The General Bar, Inc., 36 West 44th Street,
New York 36, New York.
The International Lawyers, International Lawyers Company, Inc.,
33 West 42nd Street, New York 18, New York.
The National List, The National List, Inc., 75 West Street, New
York 6, New York.
Rand McNally List of Bank Recommended Attorneys, Rand Mc-
Nally & Company, P. 0. Box 7600, Chicago 80, Illinois.
Wright-Holmes Law List, Wright-Holmes Corporation, 225 West
34th Street, New York 1, New York.
GENERAL LAW LISTS
American Bank Attorneys, American Bank Attorneys, 18 Brattle
Street, Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.
The American Bar, The James C. Fifield Company, 121 West
Franklin, Minneapolis 4, Minnesota.
The Bar Register, The Bar Register Company, Inc., One Prospect
Street, Summit 1, New Jersey.
Campbell's List, Campbell's List, Inc., 905 Orange Avenue, Winter
Park, Florida.
The Lawyers Directory, The Lawyers Directory, Inc., 17 South
High Street, Columbus 15, Ohio.
The Lawyers' List, Law List Publishing Company, 111 Fifth Av-
enue, New York 3, New York.





Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., One
Prospect Street, Summit 1, New Jersey.
INSURANCE LAW LISTS
Best's Recommended Insurance Attorneys, Alfred M. Best Com-
pany, Inc., 75 Fulton Street, New York 38, New York.
Hine's Insurance Counsel, Hine's Legal Directory, Inc., 38 South
Dearborn Street, Chicago 3, Illinois.
The Insurance Bar, The Bar List Publishing Company, State Bank
Building, Evanston, Illinois.
The Underwriters List, Underwriters List Publishing Company,
308 East Eighth Street, Cincinnati 2, Ohio.
PROBATE LAW LISTS
Sullivan's Probate Directory, Sullivan's Probate Directory, Inc.,
84 Cherry Street, Galesburg, Illinois.
STATE LEGAL DIRECTORIES
The following state legal directories published by The Legal
Directories Publishing Company, 1072 Gayley Avenue, Los An-
geles 24, California:
Arkansas-Louisiana Legal Di- Mountain States Legal Direc-
rectory tory (for the States of Colo-
Carolinas and Virginias Legal rado, Idaho, Montana, New
Directory Mexico, Utah and Wyoming)
Florida-Georgia Legal Directory New York Legal Directory
Illinois Legal Directory Ohio Legal Directory
Indiana Legal Directory Oklahoma Legal Directory
Iowa Legal Directory Pacific Coast Legal Directory
Kansas Legal Directory (for the States of Arizona,
Kentucky-Tennessee Legal Di- California, Nevada, Oregon
rectory and Washington)
Minnesota, Nebraska, North Pennsylvania Legal Directory
Dakota and South Dakota Le- Texas Legal Directory
gal Directory Wisconsin Legal Directory
Missouri Legal Directory
FOREIGN LAW LISTS
Canadian Credit Men's Commercial Law and Legal Directory,
Canadian Credit Men's Trust Association, Ltd.. 12 Berryman
St., Toronto 5, Ontario, Canada.
Canadian Law List. Cartwright & Sons, Ltd., 2081 Yonge St.,
Toronto 12, Ontario, Canada.
Butterworth's Empire Law List, Butterworth & Co. (Publishers),
Ltd., 88 Kingsway, London, W. C. 2, England.
The International Law List, L. Corper-Mordaunt & Company, Pit-
man House, Parker Street, London, W. C. 2, England.
Kime's International Law Directory, Kime's International Law
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